私人股本支持的收购合同如何影响公司治理

IF 2.8 4区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Venture Capital Pub Date : 2022-09-05 DOI:10.1080/13691066.2022.2109224
Luc Wynant, S. Manigart, Veroniek Collewaert
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引用次数: 2

摘要

摘要本文探讨私募股权支持的收购合同如何影响投资组合公司的公司治理。运用代理理论和不完全契约理论,对50个实际合同进行了详细分析。契约通过限制投资前的信息不对称和调整投资者和卖方的目标来减少逆向选择风险。通过限制投资后信息不对称和通过限制自由现金流限制逃避行为来限制-à-vis管理中的道德风险。目标一致性是通过强大的激励结构实现的,同时将绩效不佳的风险转移给管理层。管理层持股问题是通过限制股票交易和限制管理层行为来解决的。剩余权力和或有权主要用于处理由于不确定性导致的不完全合同设计。很少有条款用于解决反向代理问题,即管理层免受私人股本投资者造成的道德风险问题的影响。私募股权合约具有透明且非常强大的基于结果的现金流权利,既限制了下行风险,又奖励了上行潜力。这与风险投资合同形成鲜明对比,鉴于投资组合公司的高度不确定性,风险投资合同尤其基于或有性。
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How private equity-backed buyout contracts shape corporate governance
ABSTRACT This paper explores how contracts in private equity-backed buyouts shape corporate governance in portfolio companies. Drawing upon agency theory and incomplete contracting theory, 50 actual contracts are analyzed in detail. Contracts focus on reducing adverse selection risks through limiting pre-investment information asymmetries and aligning the goals of investors and sellers. Moral hazard risks vis-à-vis management are limited through limiting post-investment information asymmetries and limiting shirking behavior through limiting free cash flows. Goal alignment is achieved through high-powered incentive structures combined with shifting risk of underperformance to management. Managerial hold-up problems are addressed through restricting share transactions and limiting managerial actions. Residual powers and contingencies are mainly used to deal with incomplete contract designs due to uncertainties. Few clauses are used to address the reverse agency problem in which management is protected against moral hazard problems created by the private equity investor. PE contracts have transparent and very strong outcome-based cash flow rights, both limiting downside risk and rewarding upside potential. This contrasts with VC contracts which are especially contingency-based given the high levels of uncertainty of the portfolio companies.
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来源期刊
Venture Capital
Venture Capital BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
4.10
自引率
16.70%
发文量
21
期刊介绍: Venture Capital publishes cutting edge research-based papers from academics and practitioners on all aspects of private equity finance such as: •institutional venture capital •informal venture capital •corporate venture capital •public sector venture capital •community venture capital It also covers all aspects of the venture capital process from investment decision to exit, including studies on: •investment patterns •investment decision-making •investment performance •realisation of investment value exit routes (including the relationship with junior capital markets such as NASDAQ, EASDAQ, AIM and Nouvelle March). •economic impact and public policy
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