暗池交易和信息获取

Jonathan Brogaard, Jing Pan
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引用次数: 7

摘要

理论表明,暗池可能促进或阻碍信息获取。我们发现,更多的暗池交易导致更多的信息获取。我们使用收益公告周围的股价动态来衡量信息获取。为了克服内生性问题,我们利用了由于美国证券交易委员会(SEC) Tick Size试点计划的实施而导致的黑池交易的大量外生减少。结果不能用场内流动性、算法交易或信息效率来解释。一系列附加测试,例如记录SEC EDGAR搜索的变化,支持信息获取解释。
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Dark Pool Trading and Information Acquisition
Theory suggests that dark pools may facilitate or discourage information acquisition. We find that more dark pool trading leads to greater information acquisition. We measure information acquisition using stock price dynamics around earnings announcements. To overcome endogeneity concerns, we exploit a large exogenous decrease to dark pool trading that results from the implementation of the Security and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) Tick Size Pilot Program. The results cannot be explained by lit venue liquidity, algorithmic trading, or informational efficiency. A battery of additional tests, such as documenting a shift in SEC EDGAR searches, supports the information acquisition interpretation.
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