{"title":"短视的货币政策和总统权力:为什么规则很重要","authors":"J. Dorn","doi":"10.36009/CJ.39.3.5","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In the absence of a monetary rule, a central bank is vulnerable to politicization. In the case of the United States, Congress delegated monetary authority to the Federal Reserve in 1913 and has increased the scope of that authority over time, especially following crises. However, Congress has never enacted an explicit rule to guide Fed policy, and it has used the Fed as a scapegoat when things go awry. By law, the Federal Reserve has a triple mandate to “promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and","PeriodicalId":38832,"journal":{"name":"Cato Journal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Myopic Monetary Policy and Presidential Power: Why Rules Matter\",\"authors\":\"J. Dorn\",\"doi\":\"10.36009/CJ.39.3.5\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In the absence of a monetary rule, a central bank is vulnerable to politicization. In the case of the United States, Congress delegated monetary authority to the Federal Reserve in 1913 and has increased the scope of that authority over time, especially following crises. However, Congress has never enacted an explicit rule to guide Fed policy, and it has used the Fed as a scapegoat when things go awry. By law, the Federal Reserve has a triple mandate to “promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and\",\"PeriodicalId\":38832,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Cato Journal\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-09-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Cato Journal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.36009/CJ.39.3.5\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"Economics, Econometrics and Finance\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Cato Journal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.36009/CJ.39.3.5","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"Economics, Econometrics and Finance","Score":null,"Total":0}
Myopic Monetary Policy and Presidential Power: Why Rules Matter
In the absence of a monetary rule, a central bank is vulnerable to politicization. In the case of the United States, Congress delegated monetary authority to the Federal Reserve in 1913 and has increased the scope of that authority over time, especially following crises. However, Congress has never enacted an explicit rule to guide Fed policy, and it has used the Fed as a scapegoat when things go awry. By law, the Federal Reserve has a triple mandate to “promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and