黑格尔权利哲学背景下的21世纪偶然权力——特朗普与推特是一枚硬币的两面?

Elisabeth Paar, Nikolas Raunigg
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引用次数: 0

摘要

密涅瓦的猫头鹰只在黄昏时展开翅膀。这种黑格尔式的认识可能也适用于唐纳德·特朗普(Donald Trump)执政的最后几天,这不仅为当时的美国总统与美国宪法之间的关系,也为他与他的主要沟通手段——推特之间的关系开创了许多先例。总统围绕权力过渡的混乱沟通在一群愤怒的暴民冲击国会大厦时达到了高潮,他们徒劳地试图恢复或废除民主——这取决于人们相信谁的叙述。推特随后决定禁止特朗普使用其服务煽动或至少纵容叛乱,这一决定迅速引发了围绕当代社会权力分配问题的激烈讨论。这些讨论的核心是两个核心要素:自由和限制自由的(合法)权力。一方认为平台运营商侵犯了特朗普的言论自由。相反,另一方声称,限制特朗普的沟通能力是保护美国宪法秩序和自由民主主义的必然步骤。与此同时,人们的注意力逐渐集中在更大的潜在问题上。一个共同的方面是,这两种立场似乎都预设了一种过于形式主义的自由概念。在更抽象的层面上,这些事件也可以归结为两种不同权力诉求的冲突:社交媒体运营商反对国家元首声称的为所欲为。因此,本文希望分析平台运营商及其各自对应方采取行动的合法性来源。这一分析基于黑格尔的《法哲学》。特别是,黑格尔对自由、理想国家和普遍规则可能的合法来源的理解将被运用。黑格尔法哲学的第一个接触点是他对国家元首的看法,他与法律的关系,特别是与宪法的关系,以及与选民的关系。在这样的背景下,黑格尔的国家中权力的分配是如何确定的。然后,尝试将潜在的思想和考虑转移到美国宪法所规定的权力结构和合法化因素上。此外,本文还考察了国家对国家元首可能有问题的行为作出反应的可能性。重点将放在让他们对针对国家本身或其宪法秩序的行为负责的可能性上。特别是在分歧严重的国家,弹劾程序的效力令人质疑的背景下,私人行为者是否可以合法干预的问题就出现了。具体来说,社交媒体运营商是否可以合法地阻止国家元首使用他们的平台,以保护国家、法律体系或民主。
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Contingent Power in the 21st Century Against the Backdrop of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right – Trump and Twitter as Two Sides of the Same Coin?
Abstract The Owl of Minerva only spreads its wings at dusk. This Hegelian realization might also apply to the last days of Donald Trump in office which brought about many a precedent in the relationship not only between the then President of the United States and its constitution but also between him and his main means of communication: Twitter. The president’s tumultuous communication surrounding the transition of power climaxed in an angry mob storming the Capitol in a vain attempt to – dependent on whose narrative one credits – either restore or abolish democracy. Twitter’s subsequent decision to ban Trump from using its services for arguably inciting or at least condoning the insurrection quickly led to heated discussions rooted in the issue of the allocation of power within contemporary societies. At the core of these discussions lie two central elements: freedom and the (legitimate) power to restrict it. One side argued that the platform operators had infringed Trump’s freedom of speech. In contrast, the other side claimed that abridging Trump’s ability to communicate whatever came to his mind was an inevitable step to protect the American constitutional order and thus liberal democracy. Meanwhile, attention has gradually been focused on the larger underlying issues. One common aspect is that both positions seem to presuppose a concept of freedom that is all too formalistic. On a more abstract level, the events also boil down to a clash of two separate claims to power: Social media operators opposing the head of state’s claim to do as he wishes. Thus, the paper aspires to analyze the sources of legitimacy for the actions taken by platform operators and their respective counterparts. The analysis is based on Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. In particular, Hegel’s understanding of freedom, the ideal state and of possible legitimate sources for universal rules shall be put to use. The first point of contact in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right is his view of the head of state, his relation to the law, especially to the constitution, and to his constituents. Against this backdrop, it shall be determined how power is distributed in Hegel’s state. Then, an attempt shall be made to transfer the underlying ideas and considerations to the power structure and the legitimizing factors as they are laid down in the US Constitution. Furthermore, the paper examines the state’s possibilities to react to possibly problematic behavior of the head of state. The focus will be placed on the possibility of holding them accountable for actions directed against the state itself or its constitutional order. Particularly against the backdrop of the questionable efficacy of impeachment procedures in deeply divided nations, the question arises as to whether private actors can legitimately intervene. Concretely, whether social media operators may legitimately bar heads of state from using their platforms in order to protect the state, the legal system or democracy.
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