贷款创造存款时的银行资本和莫迪利亚-米勒定理

George Dotsis
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文认为,为了确定最优银行资本结构,不应将银行视为可贷资金的中介。这是因为银行通过放贷过程创造存款。莫迪利亚-米勒分析不适用于银行,因为当贷款创造存款时,银行的资产方面与负债方面一起变化,权益表现得更像一个粘性变量。在这种背景下,银行业的总体顺周期高杠杆几乎是自动出现的。本文提供了一些与这一观点一致的经验证据,并讨论了对银行监管的影响。
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Bank Capital and the Modigliani-Miller Theorem When Loans Create Deposits
This paper argues that banks should not be treated as intermediaries of loanable funds in order to determine optimal bank capital structure. This is because banks create deposits through the process of lending. The Modigliani–Miller analysis cannot be applied to banks because when lending creates deposits the asset side of banks varies together with the liability side and equity behaves more like a sticky variable. In this setting, aggregate procyclical high leverage in the banking sector emerges almost automatically. The paper provides some empirical evidence consistent with this view and discusses implications with respect to bank regulation.
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