“第二次或连续的”人身保护申请和Panetti诉Quarterman案后的迟滞索赔

IF 1.9 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW University of Chicago Law Review Pub Date : 2007-10-01 DOI:10.2307/20141868
K. Reynolds
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引用次数: 1

摘要

61 .《1996年反恐怖主义和有效死刑法》规定,除特殊情况外,人身保护令的"第二次或连续"申请必须被驳回然而,一些有效的宪法要求,在囚犯被定罪和判刑之后,或者在一份人身保护申请被提出并根据案情被拒绝之后,才变得成熟。AEDPA的“把关”条款-编纂在28南加州大学?第2244(b)条有可能取消对有价值的宪法请求的审查,并且巡回法院对其解释已经形成了分歧。一组法院采取了“自由”的方式,专注于aedpa之前的普通法原则,并在所有索赔方面都犯了错误。另一套则采取了更为严格的文本和结构策略,这在解释层面上颇具吸引力,但有可能阻止对违反宪法的行为进行司法审查。苏最高法院最近处理了这个问题的一个有限方面,它以实用主义的方式运用了自由主义的方法。所有这些办法都有严重的缺点,本评论意见认为,应当遵循案文解释,除非在某些情况下,这种解释将排除对可能违反宪法的行为的审查。在这种情况下,法院应援引宪法回避原则,以防止侵犯囚犯通过人身保护令寻求维护的基本宪法权利。简而言之,这篇评论关注的是一个非常特殊的问题,但这个问题可能非常重要。想象一下,一名囚犯向联邦法院申请人身保护令,请愿书根据案情得到了适当的裁决。如果她再次提交,这一次包括了在早期请愿时尚未成熟的索赔要求,因此不包括在内,那么按时间顺序排列的第二份请愿书必须被驳回为“第二份或第二份”
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"Second or Successive" Habeas Petitions and Late-Ripening Claims after Panetti v Quarterman
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 19961 (AEDPA) provides that, except in narrow circumstances, "second or successive" petitions for writs of habeas corpus must be dismissed.2 Some valid constitutional claims, however, do not become ripe until after the prisoner has been convicted and sentenced, and perhaps af ter one habeas petition has been presented and denied on the merits. AEDPA's "gatekeeping" provisions-codified at 28 USC ? 2244(b) have the potential to foreclose review of meritorious constitutional claims, and a division in the circuit courts has developed over their interpretation. One set of courts takes a "liberal" approach, focusing on pre-AEDPA common law principles and erring on the side of al lowing claims. Another set takes a more rigorous textual and struc tural tack, which is appealing on an interpretive level but has the po tential to prevent judicial review of constitutional violations. The Su preme Court has recently addressed a limited aspect of this question, and it applied the liberal approach with a pragmatist flourish. All of these approaches suffer from serious shortcomings, and this Comment argues that the textual interpretation should be followed except in certain circumstances in which that interpretation would foreclose review of a possible constitutional violation. In this scenario, courts should invoke the canon of constitutional avoidance to prevent violat ing the underlying constitutional right that the prisoner seeks to vindi cate through a writ of habeas corpus. In short, this Comment focuses on a very particular question, but one that could be of great import. Imagine a prisoner petitions a fed eral court for a writ of habeas corpus, and the petition is duly adjudi cated on the merits. If she files again, this time including a claim that was unripe at the time of the earlier petition and thus not included, must the chronologically second petition be dismissed as "second or
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期刊介绍: The University of Chicago Law Review is a quarterly journal of legal scholarship. Often cited in Supreme Court and other court opinions, as well as in other scholarly works, it is among the most influential journals in the field. Students have full responsibility for editing and publishing the Law Review; they also contribute original scholarship of their own. The Law Review"s editorial board selects all pieces for publication and, with the assistance of staff members, performs substantive and technical edits on each of these pieces prior to publication.
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