见见寡头:商业合法性和高层税收

R. Di Tella, J. Dubra, A. Lagomarsino
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引用次数: 1

摘要

我们研究了对商业精英的信任和对政府的信任对高层税收偏好的因果影响。利用新的调查数据,我们发现不信任会导致对收入最高的1%人群的期望税收增加。例如,当对政府的信任度较低时,我们对商业精英的不信任导致对前1%人群的期望税收增加2.4个百分点(这缩小了民主党和共和党在税收优惠方面的27%差距);我们对政府的不信任处理也得到了类似的结果。
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Meet the Oligarchs: Business Legitimacy and Taxation at the Top
We study the causal impact of trust in business elites and trust in government on preferences for taxation at the top. Using new survey data, we find that distrust causes an increase in desired taxes on the top 1 percent. For example, our distrust-in-business-elites treatment leads to an increase in desired taxes on the top 1 percent of 2.4 percentage points (it closes 27 percent of the Democrat-Republican gap in tax preferences) when trust in government is low; a similar result is obtained for our distrust-in-government treatment.
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