比特币兼容的虚拟通道

Lukas Aumayr, O. Ersoy, Andreas Erwig, Sebastian Faust, Kristina Hostáková, Matteo Maffei, Pedro A. Moreno-Sánchez, S. Riahi
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引用次数: 33

摘要

目前,比特币等无需许可的加密货币的交易速度有限,确认时间较慢,这阻碍了进一步的采用。支付通道是解决这些问题最有希望的解决方案之一,因为它们允许通道各方以点对点的方式执行任意多笔支付,同时只在区块链上上传两笔交易。这一概念已被推广到支付通道网络中,其中使用支付通道的路径来结算两个用户之间可能不共享直接通道的支付。然而,这种方法需要路径中的每个用户的积极参与,使系统不太可靠(他们可能离线),更昂贵(他们每次支付收取费用),并且更慢(中介需要积极参与支付)。为了缓解这个问题,最近的工作引入了虚拟通道的概念(IEEE标准普尔' 19),它只涉及中间人在付款人和收款人之间建立桥梁的初始创建,他们可以在以后独立执行任意多的链下交易。不幸的是,现有的结构只适用于以太坊,因为它们依赖于以太坊的账户模型和图灵完备的脚本语言。迄今为止,在其他脚本功能有限的区块链技术(如比特币)中实现虚拟通道被认为是一个公开的挑战。在这项工作中,我们提出了建立在utxo模型上的第一个虚拟通道协议,并且需要一种仅支持数字签名方案和时间锁功能的脚本语言,因此与几乎所有加密货币向后兼容,包括比特币。我们将虚拟通道的安全特性形式化为通用可组合性框架中的一种理想功能,并证明了我们的协议构成了其安全实现。我们在比特币区块链上对我们的协议进行了原型化和评估,证明了它的效率:对于n次连续支付,它们需要9+2n个交易的链下交换,或者总共3524+695n个字节,在乐观的情况下没有链上足迹。与支付通道网络中的路由支付相比,这是一个实质性的改进,支付通道网络需要8n个交易,总共交换3026n个字节。
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Bitcoin-Compatible Virtual Channels
Current permissionless cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin suffer from a limited transaction rate and slow confirmation time, which hinders further adoption. Payment channels are one of the most promising solutions to address these problems, as they allow the parties of the channel to perform arbitrarily many payments in a peer-to-peer fashion while uploading only two transactions on the blockchain. This concept has been generalized into payment channel networks where a path of payment channels is used to settle the payment between two users that might not share a direct channel between them. However, this approach requires the active involvement of each user in the path, making the system less reliable (they might be offline), more expensive (they charge fees per payment), and slower (intermediaries need to be actively involved in the payment). To mitigate this issue, recent work has introduced the concept of virtual channels (IEEE S&P’19), which involve intermediaries only in the initial creation of a bridge between payer and payee, who can later on independently perform arbitrarily many off-chain transactions. Unfortunately, existing constructions are only available for Ethereum, as they rely on its account model and Turing-complete scripting language. The realization of virtual channels in other blockchain technologies with limited scripting capabilities, like Bitcoin, was so far considered an open challenge.In this work, we present the first virtual channel protocols that are built on the UTXO-model and require a scripting language supporting only a digital signature scheme and a timelock functionality, being thus backward compatible with virtually every cryptocurrency, including Bitcoin. We formalize the security properties of virtual channels as an ideal functionality in the Universal Composability framework and prove that our protocol constitutes a secure realization thereof. We have prototyped and evaluated our protocol on the Bitcoin blockchain, demonstrating its efficiency: for n sequential payments, they require an off-chain exchange of 9+2n transactions or a total of 3524+695n bytes, with no on-chain footprint in the optimistic case. This is a substantial improvement compared to routing payments in a payment channel network, which requires 8n transactions with a total of 3026n bytes to be exchanged.
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