{"title":"衡量平均主义社会福利下躺在MARA中的利益","authors":"Jonathan Carrero, Ismael Rodríguez, F. Rubio","doi":"10.1109/SMC42975.2020.9282975","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"When some resources are to be distributed among a set of agents following egalitarian social welfare, the goal is to maximize the utility of the agent whose utility turns out to be minimal. In this context, agents can have an incentive to lie about their actual preferences, so that more valuable resources are assigned to them. In this paper we analyze this situation, and we present a practical study where genetic algorithms are used to assess the benefits of lying under different situations.","PeriodicalId":6718,"journal":{"name":"2020 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics (SMC)","volume":"41 1","pages":"559-566"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Measuring the benefits of lying in MARA under egalitarian social welfare\",\"authors\":\"Jonathan Carrero, Ismael Rodríguez, F. Rubio\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/SMC42975.2020.9282975\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"When some resources are to be distributed among a set of agents following egalitarian social welfare, the goal is to maximize the utility of the agent whose utility turns out to be minimal. In this context, agents can have an incentive to lie about their actual preferences, so that more valuable resources are assigned to them. In this paper we analyze this situation, and we present a practical study where genetic algorithms are used to assess the benefits of lying under different situations.\",\"PeriodicalId\":6718,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2020 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics (SMC)\",\"volume\":\"41 1\",\"pages\":\"559-566\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-10-11\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"4\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2020 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics (SMC)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/SMC42975.2020.9282975\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2020 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics (SMC)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SMC42975.2020.9282975","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Measuring the benefits of lying in MARA under egalitarian social welfare
When some resources are to be distributed among a set of agents following egalitarian social welfare, the goal is to maximize the utility of the agent whose utility turns out to be minimal. In this context, agents can have an incentive to lie about their actual preferences, so that more valuable resources are assigned to them. In this paper we analyze this situation, and we present a practical study where genetic algorithms are used to assess the benefits of lying under different situations.
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