{"title":"国际货币基金组织作为最后贷款人的轻率角色","authors":"Charles W. Calomiris","doi":"10.7916/D8H4220N","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Throughout history, financial collapses have been defining moments for public policy. Crises promote action, embodied in new financial institutions or policy doctrines. The motives that underlie such policies are sometimes short-sighted--driven by short-run pressures rather than long-run principles--and it is easier to enact unwise policy in the midst of crisis than to reverse course after the crisis has passed, after policies become embodied in institutions or statutes.","PeriodicalId":38832,"journal":{"name":"Cato Journal","volume":"10 1","pages":"275-294"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1998-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"180","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The IMF's Imprudent Role As Lender of Last Resort\",\"authors\":\"Charles W. Calomiris\",\"doi\":\"10.7916/D8H4220N\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Throughout history, financial collapses have been defining moments for public policy. Crises promote action, embodied in new financial institutions or policy doctrines. The motives that underlie such policies are sometimes short-sighted--driven by short-run pressures rather than long-run principles--and it is easier to enact unwise policy in the midst of crisis than to reverse course after the crisis has passed, after policies become embodied in institutions or statutes.\",\"PeriodicalId\":38832,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Cato Journal\",\"volume\":\"10 1\",\"pages\":\"275-294\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1998-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"180\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Cato Journal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.7916/D8H4220N\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"Economics, Econometrics and Finance\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Cato Journal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.7916/D8H4220N","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"Economics, Econometrics and Finance","Score":null,"Total":0}
Throughout history, financial collapses have been defining moments for public policy. Crises promote action, embodied in new financial institutions or policy doctrines. The motives that underlie such policies are sometimes short-sighted--driven by short-run pressures rather than long-run principles--and it is easier to enact unwise policy in the midst of crisis than to reverse course after the crisis has passed, after policies become embodied in institutions or statutes.