从行为哲学看刑法中自愿行为的基本要件

IF 0.4 Q2 Social Sciences New Criminal Law Review Pub Date : 2020-11-27 DOI:10.1525/NCLR.2020.23.4.437
J. Child
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引用次数: 1

摘要

在寻求确定刑事责任的基本成分时,通常会参考自愿行为要求(VAR)。我们对被告(D)所做的或(可能)未做的行为进行指责,而此类行为或未做行为是法律所禁止的;我们不会仅仅惩罚思想或性格。然而,尽管VAR在抽象原则上一直具有吸引力,但它所包含的精确定义和限制并不总是明确的,它在防止不当刑事定罪方面的作用也受到公开(在许多情况下是正确的)挑战。最重要的是,VAR近年来受到了来自行动哲学内部批评者的持续攻击,突出了其描述性和规范性的缺陷。有人认为,这种批评是错误的。本文为VAR的精简定义提供了辩护,将哲学中的一般行为定义与刑法中的行为定义区分开来,并试图确定和保留后者在理论上可行的模型。
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Defense of a Basic Voluntary Act Requirement in Criminal Law from Philosophies of Action
When looking to identify the basic ingredients of criminal responsibility, reference is standardly made to a voluntary act requirement (VAR). We blame a defendant (D) for what she has done or (perhaps) failed to do where such doing or failing to do is proscribed by law; we do not punish mere thoughts or character. However, despite the continued appeal of the VAR in abstract principle, the precise definitions and restrictions entailed within it are not always clear, and its usefulness in preventing inappropriate criminalisation is openly (and in many cases correctly) challenged. Principally, and crucially, the VAR has received sustained attack in recent years from critics within the philosophies of action, highlighting its descriptive and normative shortcomings. It is contended that such criticism is misplaced. This article provides defence to a stripped-back definition of the VAR, distinguishing the general definition of action in philosophy from the definition of action within the criminal law, and seeking to identify and preserve a doctrinally workable model of the latter.
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期刊介绍: Focused on examinations of crime and punishment in domestic, transnational, and international contexts, New Criminal Law Review provides timely, innovative commentary and in-depth scholarly analyses on a wide range of criminal law topics. The journal encourages a variety of methodological and theoretical approaches and is a crucial resource for criminal law professionals in both academia and the criminal justice system. The journal publishes thematic forum sections and special issues, full-length peer-reviewed articles, book reviews, and occasional correspondence.
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