负责任数据治理的激励机制设计:一项大规模现场实验

IF 1.5 Q3 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS ACM Journal of Data and Information Quality Pub Date : 2023-04-19 DOI:10.1145/3592617
Christina Timko, Malte Niederstadt, Naman Goel, Boi Faltings
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引用次数: 0

摘要

负责任的人工智能的一个关键组成部分是负责任的数据治理,包括数据收集。最新的欧盟法规也强调了它的重要性。数据应该是高质量的,最重要的是正确和具有代表性的,提供数据的个人应该对收集的数据拥有自主权。在本文中,我们考虑收集个人测量的健身数据(身体活动测量)的设置,其中一些个人可能没有动力测量和报告准确的数据。这可能会显著降低收集数据的质量。另一方面,这种性质的高质量集体数据可以用于可靠的科学见解或构建值得信赖的人工智能应用程序。我们进行了一项有框架的实地实验(N = 691),以检验提供固定的和依赖于质量的货币激励对收集数据质量的影响。我们使用基于同行的激励兼容机制来实现质量依赖的激励,而不需要对个人进行抽查或监督。我们发现,激励兼容机制可以在提供良好用户体验和公平补偿的同时获得高质量的数据,尽管在具体的研究背景下,两种激励方案下的数据质量并不一定不同。我们从实验中提供了新的设计见解,并讨论了未来可解释和透明数据收集的现场实验和应用可能关注的方向。
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Incentive Mechanism Design for Responsible Data Governance: A Large-scale Field Experiment
A crucial building block of responsible artificial intelligence is responsible data governance, including data collection. Its importance is also underlined in the latest EU regulations. The data should be of high quality, foremost correct and representative, and individuals providing the data should have autonomy over what data is collected. In this article, we consider the setting of collecting personally measured fitness data (physical activity measurements), in which some individuals may not have an incentive to measure and report accurate data. This can significantly degrade the quality of the collected data. On the other hand, high-quality collective data of this nature could be used for reliable scientific insights or to build trustworthy artificial intelligence applications. We conduct a framed field experiment (N = 691) to examine the effect of offering fixed and quality-dependent monetary incentives on the quality of the collected data. We use a peer-based incentive-compatible mechanism for the quality-dependent incentives without spot-checking or surveilling individuals. We find that the incentive-compatible mechanism can elicit good-quality data while providing a good user experience and compensating fairly, although, in the specific study context, the data quality does not necessarily differ under the two incentive schemes. We contribute new design insights from the experiment and discuss directions that future field experiments and applications on explainable and transparent data collection may focus on.
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来源期刊
ACM Journal of Data and Information Quality
ACM Journal of Data and Information Quality COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS-
CiteScore
4.10
自引率
4.80%
发文量
0
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