寡头垄断市场电力竞价动态模型及其混沌控制

ZHANG Xin-hua, LAI Ming-yong, YE Ze
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引用次数: 2

摘要

本文基于古诺博弈,在自适应理性和有限理性的条件下,分别建立了两个发电商和三个发电商的动态竞价系统模型。对纳什均衡的稳定性进行了解析分析,并通过数值模拟得到了纳什均衡的稳定区域、分岔和混沌奇异吸引子。此外,利用状态延迟反馈控制方法分析了动态竞价系统的混沌控制,数值仿真结果表明,只要选择合适的控制变量和参数,寡头垄断竞价动态的纳什均衡是可维持的。
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Dynamic Model for Power Bidding and Its Chaos Control in Oligopoly Market

In this article, with adaptive and bounded rational dynamics, the dynamic bidding system models, including the cases of two and three power producers, are presented, respectively, based on Cournot game. The stability of Nash equilibriums are analyzed analytically, after which the stable regions, bifurcations, and chaotic stranger attractors are displayed by numerical simulations. In addition, chaos control of dynamic bidding systems are analyzed with state delayed feedback control method, and numerical simulations indicate that Nash equilibrium of oligopoly bidding dynamics is maintainable if suitable control variables and parameters are chosen.

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