{"title":"OneSwarm匿名文件共享系统的法医调查","authors":"Swagatika Prusty, B. Levine, M. Liberatore","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2046731","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"OneSwarm is a system for anonymous p2p file sharing in use by thousands of peers. It aims to provide Onion Routing-like privacy and BitTorrent-like performance. We demonstrate several flaws in OneSwarm's design and implementation through three different attacks available to forensic investigators. First, we prove that the current design is vulnerable to a novel timing attack that allows just two attackers attached to the same target to determine if it is the source of queried content. When attackers comprise 15% of OneSwarm peers, we expect over 90% of remaining peers will be attached to two attackers and therefore vulnerable. Thwarting the attack increases OneSwarm query response times, making them longer than the equivalent in Onion Routing. Second, we show that OneSwarm's vulnerability to traffic analysis by colluding attackers is much greater than was previously reported, and is much worse than Onion Routing. We show for this second attack that when investigators comprise 25% of peers, over 40% of the network can be investigated with 80% precision to find the sources of content. Our examination of the OneSwarm source code found differences with the technical paper that significantly reduce security. For the implementation in use by thousands of people, attackers that comprise 25% of the network can successfully use this second attack against 98% of remaining peers with 95% precision. Finally, we show that a novel application of a known TCP-based attack allows a single attacker to identify whether a neighbor is the source of data or a proxy for it. Users that turn off the default rate-limit setting are exposed. Each attack can be repeated as investigators leave and rejoin the network. All of our attacks are successful in a forensics context: Law enforcement can use them legally ahead of a warrant. Furthermore, private investigators, who have fewer restrictions on their behavior, can use them more easily in pursuit of evidence for such civil suits as copyright infringement.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"165 1","pages":"201-214"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"37","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Forensic investigation of the OneSwarm anonymous filesharing system\",\"authors\":\"Swagatika Prusty, B. Levine, M. Liberatore\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/2046707.2046731\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"OneSwarm is a system for anonymous p2p file sharing in use by thousands of peers. It aims to provide Onion Routing-like privacy and BitTorrent-like performance. We demonstrate several flaws in OneSwarm's design and implementation through three different attacks available to forensic investigators. First, we prove that the current design is vulnerable to a novel timing attack that allows just two attackers attached to the same target to determine if it is the source of queried content. When attackers comprise 15% of OneSwarm peers, we expect over 90% of remaining peers will be attached to two attackers and therefore vulnerable. Thwarting the attack increases OneSwarm query response times, making them longer than the equivalent in Onion Routing. Second, we show that OneSwarm's vulnerability to traffic analysis by colluding attackers is much greater than was previously reported, and is much worse than Onion Routing. We show for this second attack that when investigators comprise 25% of peers, over 40% of the network can be investigated with 80% precision to find the sources of content. Our examination of the OneSwarm source code found differences with the technical paper that significantly reduce security. For the implementation in use by thousands of people, attackers that comprise 25% of the network can successfully use this second attack against 98% of remaining peers with 95% precision. Finally, we show that a novel application of a known TCP-based attack allows a single attacker to identify whether a neighbor is the source of data or a proxy for it. Users that turn off the default rate-limit setting are exposed. Each attack can be repeated as investigators leave and rejoin the network. All of our attacks are successful in a forensics context: Law enforcement can use them legally ahead of a warrant. Furthermore, private investigators, who have fewer restrictions on their behavior, can use them more easily in pursuit of evidence for such civil suits as copyright infringement.\",\"PeriodicalId\":72687,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security\",\"volume\":\"165 1\",\"pages\":\"201-214\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2011-10-17\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"37\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2046731\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2046731","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 37

摘要

OneSwarm是一个匿名p2p文件共享系统,被成千上万的同行使用。它旨在提供类似洋葱路由的隐私和类似bittorrent的性能。我们通过法医调查人员可以使用的三种不同的攻击来展示OneSwarm设计和实现中的几个缺陷。首先,我们证明了当前的设计很容易受到一种新的定时攻击,这种定时攻击允许两个攻击者连接到同一个目标上,以确定它是否是查询内容的来源。当攻击者占OneSwarm对等体的15%时,我们预计超过90%的剩余对等体将连接到两个攻击者,因此容易受到攻击。阻止攻击会增加OneSwarm查询响应时间,使其比洋葱路由中的响应时间更长。其次,我们表明,OneSwarm对串通攻击者的流量分析的脆弱性比之前报道的要大得多,而且比洋葱路由更糟糕。对于第二次攻击,我们表明,当调查人员占同行的25%时,可以以80%的精度调查超过40%的网络,以找到内容的来源。我们对OneSwarm源代码的检查发现了与技术论文的差异,这些差异显著降低了安全性。对于数千人使用的实现,占网络25%的攻击者可以成功地对剩余的98%的对等体使用第二次攻击,准确率为95%。最后,我们展示了一种已知的基于tcp的攻击的新应用程序,它允许单个攻击者识别邻居是数据源还是它的代理。关闭默认速率限制设置的用户将被暴露。每次攻击都可以在调查人员离开并重新加入网络时重复进行。我们所有的攻击在取证环境中都是成功的:执法部门可以在获得搜查令之前合法地使用它们。此外,私人侦探对其行为的限制较少,可以更容易地利用它们来追查版权侵权等民事诉讼的证据。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Forensic investigation of the OneSwarm anonymous filesharing system
OneSwarm is a system for anonymous p2p file sharing in use by thousands of peers. It aims to provide Onion Routing-like privacy and BitTorrent-like performance. We demonstrate several flaws in OneSwarm's design and implementation through three different attacks available to forensic investigators. First, we prove that the current design is vulnerable to a novel timing attack that allows just two attackers attached to the same target to determine if it is the source of queried content. When attackers comprise 15% of OneSwarm peers, we expect over 90% of remaining peers will be attached to two attackers and therefore vulnerable. Thwarting the attack increases OneSwarm query response times, making them longer than the equivalent in Onion Routing. Second, we show that OneSwarm's vulnerability to traffic analysis by colluding attackers is much greater than was previously reported, and is much worse than Onion Routing. We show for this second attack that when investigators comprise 25% of peers, over 40% of the network can be investigated with 80% precision to find the sources of content. Our examination of the OneSwarm source code found differences with the technical paper that significantly reduce security. For the implementation in use by thousands of people, attackers that comprise 25% of the network can successfully use this second attack against 98% of remaining peers with 95% precision. Finally, we show that a novel application of a known TCP-based attack allows a single attacker to identify whether a neighbor is the source of data or a proxy for it. Users that turn off the default rate-limit setting are exposed. Each attack can be repeated as investigators leave and rejoin the network. All of our attacks are successful in a forensics context: Law enforcement can use them legally ahead of a warrant. Furthermore, private investigators, who have fewer restrictions on their behavior, can use them more easily in pursuit of evidence for such civil suits as copyright infringement.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
9.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
The Danger of Minimum Exposures: Understanding Cross-App Information Leaks on iOS through Multi-Side-Channel Learning. WristPrint: Characterizing User Re-identification Risks from Wrist-worn Accelerometry Data. CCS '21: 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Virtual Event, Republic of Korea, November 15 - 19, 2021 WAHC '21: Proceedings of the 9th on Workshop on Encrypted Computing & Applied Homomorphic Cryptography, Virtual Event, Korea, 15 November 2021 Incremental Learning Algorithm of Data Complexity Based on KNN Classifier
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1