公司治理决策如何影响债券持有人

IF 0.9 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE Quarterly Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2016-08-04 DOI:10.1142/S2010139216500117
Hong Li, Y. Wang
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引用次数: 6

摘要

现有研究表明,GIM公司治理指数(包含反收购条款)与公司债务成本之间存在负相关关系,这意味着反收购条款的减少可能导致股东对债券持有人财富的更多剥夺。也就是说,强有力的公司治理会伤害债券持有人(资产替代假说)。然而,另一种研究断言,治理机制可能通过降低代理成本和减少公司与贷方之间的信息不对称(监测假设)而使债券持有人受益。我们通过考虑自我选择效应来重新审视这个问题。我们发现,这两个假设都可以成立,企业在自我选择治理时考虑到债务成本的降低,如果做出替代治理决策,债务成本会高得多。
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How do Corporate Governance Decisions Affect Bondholders
Existing studies have documented a negative relationship between the GIM corporate governance index (which contains anti-takeover provisions) and the corporate cost of debt, which implies that fewer anti-takeover provisions may lead to a larger shareholder expropriation of bondholder wealth. That is, strong corporate governance hurts bondholders (asset substitution hypothesis). However, another stream of research asserts that governance mechanisms may benefit bondholders by paring down agency costs and decreasing information asymmetry between the firm and the lenders (monitoring hypothesis). We reexamine this issue by considering the self-selection effect. We find that both hypotheses can be true, and that firms consider the reduction of cost of debt when self-selecting their governance, and the cost of debt would have been much higher had the alternative governance decision been made.
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来源期刊
Quarterly Journal of Finance
Quarterly Journal of Finance BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
1.10
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0
期刊介绍: The Quarterly Journal of Finance publishes high-quality papers in all areas of finance, including corporate finance, asset pricing, financial econometrics, international finance, macro-finance, behavioral finance, banking and financial intermediation, capital markets, risk management and insurance, derivatives, quantitative finance, corporate governance and compensation, investments and entrepreneurial finance.
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