{"title":"罗伊·伍德·塞拉斯的唯物主义","authors":"B. Gimes","doi":"10.1086/712933","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Physicalism is often characterized as an empirical hypothesis. But according to an alternative conceptualization, it is instead a stance or an attitude. I analyze Roy Wood Sellars’s materialist philosophy in order to show that it is a counterexample to a specific physicalist empirical hypothesis: the minimal completeness of the physical. However, it is arguably not reducible to a stance: it is a meaningful metaphysical thesis with substantive cognitive content.","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"16 1","pages":"166 - 182"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2020-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Materialism of Roy Wood Sellars\",\"authors\":\"B. Gimes\",\"doi\":\"10.1086/712933\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Physicalism is often characterized as an empirical hypothesis. But according to an alternative conceptualization, it is instead a stance or an attitude. I analyze Roy Wood Sellars’s materialist philosophy in order to show that it is a counterexample to a specific physicalist empirical hypothesis: the minimal completeness of the physical. However, it is arguably not reducible to a stance: it is a meaningful metaphysical thesis with substantive cognitive content.\",\"PeriodicalId\":42878,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science\",\"volume\":\"16 1\",\"pages\":\"166 - 182\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-12-16\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1086/712933\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1086/712933","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Physicalism is often characterized as an empirical hypothesis. But according to an alternative conceptualization, it is instead a stance or an attitude. I analyze Roy Wood Sellars’s materialist philosophy in order to show that it is a counterexample to a specific physicalist empirical hypothesis: the minimal completeness of the physical. However, it is arguably not reducible to a stance: it is a meaningful metaphysical thesis with substantive cognitive content.
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