股票期权是经理人的福气吗?股票期权补偿与制度控制

IF 2.8 Q2 BUSINESS Corporate Communications Pub Date : 2001-04-01 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.251009
Matthias Benz, M. Kucher, A. Stutzer
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引用次数: 69

摘要

授予高管股票期权,在很大程度上推动了近年来美国高管薪酬的大幅增长。本文认为,与其他形式的薪酬相比,股票期权产生了强烈的激励,促使管理者从事游说活动以获得更高的薪酬。对标准普尔500指数公司和1992年至1997年的实证结果表明,这种撇脂活动的相对成功是由制度控制决定的。当董事会和股东的控制权较高,公司产品市场的竞争更强时,股票期权授予量就会大大降低。
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Are Stock Options the Managers' Blessing? Stock Option Compensation and Institutional Controls
Stock option grants to top managers have largely contributed to the dramatic increase in US executive pay in recent years. In this paper it is argued that stock options, compared to other forms of compensation, have created strong incentives for managers to engage in lobbying activities for higher compensation. The empirical results presented for the S&P 500 firms and the years from 1992 to 1997 show that the relative success of such skimming activities is shaped by institutional controls. Stock option grants are substantially lower when control by the board of directors and the shareholders is higher, and competition on the product market of a firm is stronger.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.90
自引率
20.00%
发文量
38
期刊介绍: Corporate Communications: An International Journal addresses the issues arising from the increased awareness that an organisation''s communications are part of the whole organisation, and that the relationship an organisation has with its external public requires careful management. The responsibility for communications is increasingly being seen as part of every employee''s role and not simply the function of the marketing/PR departments. This journal will illustrate why communications are important and how best to implement a strategic communications plan.
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