{"title":"领导力、渐进主义和历史的重复:一场四幕的乌克兰悲剧","authors":"K. Grint","doi":"10.1177/17427150221103405","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Leadership is often associated with a particular form of decision-making: being decisive. This paper reflects on the limits of decisiveness and the role of incrementalism in the Russian decision to invade Ukraine and the role of the West and NATO’s decision-making over the prior 10 years. It suggests that incrementalism is both a legitimate mode and a significant problem in such scenarios, and focuses on the historical context to explain the decision to invade and the subsequent military failures.","PeriodicalId":92094,"journal":{"name":"Leadership (London)","volume":"18 1","pages":"601 - 611"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Leadership, incrementalism and the repetition of history: A Ukrainian tragedy in four acts\",\"authors\":\"K. Grint\",\"doi\":\"10.1177/17427150221103405\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Leadership is often associated with a particular form of decision-making: being decisive. This paper reflects on the limits of decisiveness and the role of incrementalism in the Russian decision to invade Ukraine and the role of the West and NATO’s decision-making over the prior 10 years. It suggests that incrementalism is both a legitimate mode and a significant problem in such scenarios, and focuses on the historical context to explain the decision to invade and the subsequent military failures.\",\"PeriodicalId\":92094,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Leadership (London)\",\"volume\":\"18 1\",\"pages\":\"601 - 611\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-05-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Leadership (London)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1177/17427150221103405\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Leadership (London)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/17427150221103405","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Leadership, incrementalism and the repetition of history: A Ukrainian tragedy in four acts
Leadership is often associated with a particular form of decision-making: being decisive. This paper reflects on the limits of decisiveness and the role of incrementalism in the Russian decision to invade Ukraine and the role of the West and NATO’s decision-making over the prior 10 years. It suggests that incrementalism is both a legitimate mode and a significant problem in such scenarios, and focuses on the historical context to explain the decision to invade and the subsequent military failures.