向巴西统一卫生系统和政党结盟的政府间转移

V. F. Orellano, Taís Cardoso Tellini
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引用次数: 0

摘要

目的本研究调查了政治联盟对政府间转移到巴西统一卫生系统(SUS)的影响。作者使用市长和中央政府之间的政治联盟的两个标准,分析了基于预先建立的规则的自动转移和自由裁量转移。设计/方法/方法对于实证分析,作者使用了回归不连续设计(RDD)和2001年至2017年之间的密切选举结果。研究结果表明,政党结盟对两类转移支付,尤其是自由裁量转移支付,以及基于预先建立的规则的转移支付都有显著的积极影响。当市长和总统来自同一政党时,直接政党结盟的效果比在市政和联邦选举中建立联盟的效果更大。研究的局限性/启示政党结盟的积极影响在自由裁量转移(那些没有先前建立规则的转移)和一些非自由裁量转移(尽管它们先前已经定义了法规)中都被发现。这些规定的一部分取决于生产能力和参与中央政府推动的计划,这可能会在融资系统中产生熵,并有利于政治盟友。在单一系统的情况下,基本医疗保健类别的熵可能大于中等和高度复杂性类别,从而允许在分配给前者的转移方面有更高的自由裁量余地。与基本卫生保健转移有关的更严格规则是可取的。在巴西,与基本医疗政府间转移有关的更严格的规则和监测将是可取的。社会意义研究结果可能会启发改进巴西基本医疗资源分配机制,通过提高基本医疗资源分配的社会公正来改善社会福利。原创性/价值作者不知道任何其他关于政党结盟对巴西统一卫生系统政府间转移分配影响的研究。
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Intergovernmental transfers to the Brazilian unified health system and party alignment
PurposeThis study investigates the impact of political alignment on intergovernmental transfers to the Brazilian unified health system (SUS). The authors analyzed both automatic transfers based on pre-established rules and discretionary transfers, using two criteria of political alignment between mayors and the central government.Design/methodology/approachFor the empirical analysis the authors used regression-discontinuity design (RDD) and the outcomes of close elections between 2001 and 2017.FindingsThe results indicate positive and statistically significant effects of party alignment on the two transfer categories, especially discretionary transfers, but also on transfers based on pre-established rules. The effect of direct party alignment, when mayors and the president are from the same party, is greater than that resulting from coalitions established in municipal and federal elections.Research limitations/implicationsThe positive effect of party alignment was found both in discretionary transfers (those that do not have previously established rules) and some non-discretionary transfers (although they have previously defined regulations). A part of these regulations depends on production capacity and on taking part in programs promoted by the central government, which may produce entropy in the financing system, and a margin to benefit political allies. In the case of the SUS system, it is possible that this entropy is greater in the basic health care category than in the moderate and high complexity one, allowing a higher margin for discretion in transfers allocated to the former. Stricter rules associated to basic health care transfers would be desirable.Practical implicationsIn Brazil, stricter rules and monitoring associated to basic healthcare intergovernmental transfers would be desirable.Social implicationsThe results may inspire some improvement in the mechanisms that govern the distribution of resources to basic healthcare in Brazil, improving social welfare by improving social justice in the distribution of resources to basic healthcare.Originality/valueThe authors does not know any other study about the impact of party alignment on the distribution of intergovernmental transfers to the Brazilian unified health system.
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