{"title":"论伊本·拉什德对亚里士多德知性不可感化概念的解释","authors":"N. Efremova","doi":"10.21146/2074-5869-2022-27-2-74-89","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This publication is an another one in a cycle of our translations done from the work of the prominent Arab Muslim philosopher Ibn Rushd (Averroes, 1126–1198) which is famous not only as the most fundamental interpretation of the Aristotel’s treatise “On the Soul” in the culture of classical Islam, but also for an original concept developed in it about a single intellect for all people (mononoism). In the first three fragments of the commentary to the opening part of chapter III.4 of this treatise (429a10–18), the analogy of thinking and feeling serves as the basis for the conclusion about the human mind as an unaffected recipient. The forward, notes, and appendix to the translation draw on relevant passages from the Ibn-Rushed’ Short and Middle commentaries to this Aristotel’s treatise, highlight the discussion in the research literature about the chronological sequence of the middle and major versions, note the most important exegetical innovations of these fragments, and set out some assumptions about their possible motives.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":"40 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"On Ibn Rushd’s Interpretation of the Aristotelian Concept of the Unaffectability of the Intellect\",\"authors\":\"N. Efremova\",\"doi\":\"10.21146/2074-5869-2022-27-2-74-89\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This publication is an another one in a cycle of our translations done from the work of the prominent Arab Muslim philosopher Ibn Rushd (Averroes, 1126–1198) which is famous not only as the most fundamental interpretation of the Aristotel’s treatise “On the Soul” in the culture of classical Islam, but also for an original concept developed in it about a single intellect for all people (mononoism). In the first three fragments of the commentary to the opening part of chapter III.4 of this treatise (429a10–18), the analogy of thinking and feeling serves as the basis for the conclusion about the human mind as an unaffected recipient. The forward, notes, and appendix to the translation draw on relevant passages from the Ibn-Rushed’ Short and Middle commentaries to this Aristotel’s treatise, highlight the discussion in the research literature about the chronological sequence of the middle and major versions, note the most important exegetical innovations of these fragments, and set out some assumptions about their possible motives.\",\"PeriodicalId\":53558,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"History of Philosophy Quarterly\",\"volume\":\"40 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-11-10\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"History of Philosophy Quarterly\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-5869-2022-27-2-74-89\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"Arts and Humanities\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-5869-2022-27-2-74-89","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
On Ibn Rushd’s Interpretation of the Aristotelian Concept of the Unaffectability of the Intellect
This publication is an another one in a cycle of our translations done from the work of the prominent Arab Muslim philosopher Ibn Rushd (Averroes, 1126–1198) which is famous not only as the most fundamental interpretation of the Aristotel’s treatise “On the Soul” in the culture of classical Islam, but also for an original concept developed in it about a single intellect for all people (mononoism). In the first three fragments of the commentary to the opening part of chapter III.4 of this treatise (429a10–18), the analogy of thinking and feeling serves as the basis for the conclusion about the human mind as an unaffected recipient. The forward, notes, and appendix to the translation draw on relevant passages from the Ibn-Rushed’ Short and Middle commentaries to this Aristotel’s treatise, highlight the discussion in the research literature about the chronological sequence of the middle and major versions, note the most important exegetical innovations of these fragments, and set out some assumptions about their possible motives.