The Anatomy of Collateralized Loan Obligations: On the Origins of Covenants and Contract Design

This paper provides a dissection of the Collateralized Loan Obligation (CLO) market and examines the significance of covenants in facilitating the provision of credit. Since the Great Financial Crisis of 2008, the leveraged loan market has witnessed unprecedented growth. CLOs play an increasingly central role in the provision of credit to corporations, holding as much as 75% of all new institutional leveraged loans, as reported in 2019. The rise of the leveraged loan and CLO markets have attracted the attention of central banks which have been concerned with both the growth of the market and the opaque nature of interconnections between intermediaries, leveraged borrowers, and investors. Despite their increasing importance, little is understood about CLO intermediaries. In this paper, I describe the agency frictions inherent in the CLO market, and discuss how optimal contracts are derived with covenants that curtail such frictions. In addition, I describe the general macroeconomic milieu that has facilitated the rapid growth of the CLO market as well as recent changes that have developed. Understanding the structural aspects and dynamics of CLOs intermediaries, situated between investors and loan syndicates, is paramount for analysis of the innards of the market, the role of covenants, and developing insights into the shadow banking sector as well as other securitizations.