合并分手

Menesh S. Patel
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引用次数: 6

摘要

当今最紧迫的反垄断问题之一是,反垄断应如何应对占主导地位的科技公司的行为。这些科技巨头曾被认为是反垄断法无法触及的对象,但如今,要求拆分反垄断的呼声越来越高,包括联邦反垄断机构采取行动,挑战和解除科技领域的关键合并。但是,几乎每一个被认定为事后挑战和拆分的技术合并都是事先由反垄断机构根据现有的联邦合并审查计划进行审查和批准的,即使在某些情况下经过了漫长的调查。因此,要求对这些已确定的技术合并进行反垄断拆分的呼声隐含了一个更为根本的反垄断问题:反垄断机构是否应该更容易地挑战它们自己先前根据现有的联邦合并审查计划审查并批准的合并?本文对这个问题作出了有条件的肯定答复。反垄断机构应增加对先前审查和批准的合并的挑战程度,但应以一种原则性的方式进行,尊重与此类合并后挑战扩张相关的重大缓解因素。通过进行原则性分析,本文确定了机构挑战扩大到先前审查和清除的合并的重要限制条件。
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Merger Breakups
One of today’s most pressing antitrust questions is how antitrust should address the conduct of dominant technology companies. Once considered untouchable by antitrust law, these technology behemoths are now the subject of growing calls for antitrust breakup, including through actions by the federal antitrust agencies to challenge and unwind key mergers in the technology space. But nearly every one of the technology mergers identified for ex post challenge and breakup was previously reviewed and cleared by the antitrust agencies pursuant to the existing federal merger review scheme, even after a lengthy investigation in some instances. The calls for the antitrust breakup of these identified technology mergers therefore implicate a much more fundamental antitrust question: should the antitrust agencies more readily challenge mergers that they themselves previously reviewed and cleared pursuant to the existing federal merger review scheme? This Article offers a qualified affirmative response to that question. The antitrust agencies should increase the extent of their challenges to previously reviewed and cleared mergers but should do so in a principled way that respects the significant mitigating factors associated with an expansion in such ex post merger challenges. By conducting that principled analysis, this Article identifies important limiting conditions on the expansion of agency challenges to previously reviewed and cleared mergers.
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