银行竞争与个人破产:来自大型银行合并的证据

Dheeraj Chaudhary
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文研究了信贷市场竞争在解释消费者破产申请中的作用。我利用大型银行合并引起的银行竞争差异来证明,在竞争更激烈的地方银行市场,个人破产率明显更高。竞争加剧促使银行通过增加信贷供应和降低信贷标准来承担更大的风险。最后,利用银行资产负债表数据,我证明了在竞争更激烈的国家经营的银行有更高的信贷供应,并表现出更高的贷款损失率,这与银行的风险承担渠道一致。
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Bank Competition and Personal Bankruptcy: Evidence from Large Bank Mergers
This paper studies the role of credit market competition in explaining consumer bankruptcy filings. I exploit variation in bank competition induced by large bank mergers to establish that personal bankruptcy rates are significantly higher in more competitive local banking markets. Higher competition prompts banks to take more risks by increasing credit supply and lowering their credit standards. Finally, using bank balance sheet data, I demonstrate that banks that operate in more competitive counties have higher credit supply and exhibit a greater loan loss rate, consistent with the bank risk-taking channel.
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