削弱SEC执法工具对市场的影响

Nerissa C. Brown, Brian T. Gale, Adrienna Huffman
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引用次数: 1

摘要

我们利用美国最高法院对Kokesh诉SEC[2017]和Lucia诉SEC[2018]的判决作为一种独特的识别策略来调查证券执法的价值。这两项决定都是出人意料的法律变化,大大削弱了SEC的执法工具。使用事件研究框架,我们发现对Kokesh和Lucia裁决的显著负面价格反应,表明股东认为SEC执法工具的削弱对普通公司来说是价值破坏。横断面测试显示,对于那些挪用风险更明显的公司和那些离SEC办公室更近的公司来说,负面的价格反应尤其严重,因为这些公司的执法往往更有效。我们的研究结果可以为正在进行的关于公共执法的价值和重要性的辩论提供信息。
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The Market Impact of Weakening SEC Enforcement Tools

We exploit the U.S. Supreme Court decisions of Kokesh v. SEC [2017] and Lucia v. SEC [2018] as a unique identification strategy to investigate the value of securities law enforcement. Both decisions were unanticipated legal changes that substantially weaken the SEC’s enforcement tools. Using an event study framework, we find a significantly negative price response to both the Kokesh and Lucia rulings, indicating shareholders view the weakening of SEC enforcement tools as value destroying for the average firm. Cross-sectional tests reveal that the negative price response is particularly severe for firms where misappropriation risks are more pronounced and for firms located closer to SEC offices, where enforcement tends to be more effective. Our findings can help inform the ongoing debate on the value and importance of public enforcement.
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