{"title":"机会主义与金融激励的作用:基于博弈论的实验分析","authors":"Angela Póvoa, Mayara Sakr, Wesley Pech","doi":"10.1590/1807-7692bar2023220014","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this study, we measured how people would take advantage of others’ misinformation, when the financial incentive size changes in economic games. We conducted a laboratory experiment based on game theory, using a modified version of the ultimatum game, where proposers had the opportunity to manipulate the responder’s beliefs by the use of ‘hide behind the small cake’ strategy. Our results contradict the selfish rationality model predictions. Intermediary financial incentives led people to adopt extremes strategies of pure fair/selfish allocation. Greater levels of financial incentive reduced the full expropriation strategy and at the same time, reduced the presence of fair offers, which suggests an interesting interaction between opportunism and psychological costs of lying. The results showed that opportunism is hugely context-dependent and people will update their decision regarding opportunism in accordance with the financial size incentive. Thus, the same person can behave differently depending on the financial value involved and will not necessarily be more selfish when the financial amount increases","PeriodicalId":53636,"journal":{"name":"BAR - Brazilian Administration Review","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Opportunism and the Role of Financial Incentives: An Experimental Analysis Based on Game Theory\",\"authors\":\"Angela Póvoa, Mayara Sakr, Wesley Pech\",\"doi\":\"10.1590/1807-7692bar2023220014\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In this study, we measured how people would take advantage of others’ misinformation, when the financial incentive size changes in economic games. We conducted a laboratory experiment based on game theory, using a modified version of the ultimatum game, where proposers had the opportunity to manipulate the responder’s beliefs by the use of ‘hide behind the small cake’ strategy. Our results contradict the selfish rationality model predictions. Intermediary financial incentives led people to adopt extremes strategies of pure fair/selfish allocation. Greater levels of financial incentive reduced the full expropriation strategy and at the same time, reduced the presence of fair offers, which suggests an interesting interaction between opportunism and psychological costs of lying. The results showed that opportunism is hugely context-dependent and people will update their decision regarding opportunism in accordance with the financial size incentive. Thus, the same person can behave differently depending on the financial value involved and will not necessarily be more selfish when the financial amount increases\",\"PeriodicalId\":53636,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"BAR - Brazilian Administration Review\",\"volume\":\"39 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-07-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"BAR - Brazilian Administration Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1590/1807-7692bar2023220014\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"Business, Management and Accounting\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"BAR - Brazilian Administration Review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1590/1807-7692bar2023220014","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"Business, Management and Accounting","Score":null,"Total":0}
Opportunism and the Role of Financial Incentives: An Experimental Analysis Based on Game Theory
In this study, we measured how people would take advantage of others’ misinformation, when the financial incentive size changes in economic games. We conducted a laboratory experiment based on game theory, using a modified version of the ultimatum game, where proposers had the opportunity to manipulate the responder’s beliefs by the use of ‘hide behind the small cake’ strategy. Our results contradict the selfish rationality model predictions. Intermediary financial incentives led people to adopt extremes strategies of pure fair/selfish allocation. Greater levels of financial incentive reduced the full expropriation strategy and at the same time, reduced the presence of fair offers, which suggests an interesting interaction between opportunism and psychological costs of lying. The results showed that opportunism is hugely context-dependent and people will update their decision regarding opportunism in accordance with the financial size incentive. Thus, the same person can behave differently depending on the financial value involved and will not necessarily be more selfish when the financial amount increases
期刊介绍:
Launched in 2004, BAR has an international scope in terms of topics of interest, target audience, and editorial boards. It is an A2-journal according to the Brazilian classification Qualis/Capes, which is thus a strong signal about the quality of published works and about the transparency of the editorial process. BAR follows the editorial principles available in document Best Practices of Scientific Publication, an initiative championed by the Brazilian Academy of Management (ANPAD) that seeks to assist journals to achieve high scholarly standards and enhance their impact as sources for theoretical and applied research. Furthermore, since 2013, BAR is a member of COPE (Committee on Publication Ethics), what is another signal of efforts made towards adhering to the most rigorous ethical principles in academic publication.