公共部门劳动法的悖论

IF 1.5 3区 社会学 Q1 LAW Indiana Law Journal Pub Date : 2009-08-21 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.1459080
M. Malin
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引用次数: 13

摘要

尽管公共部门参与集体谈判的雇员比例是私营部门的五倍多,但公共部门雇员的集体谈判仍然非常有争议。反对公共部门雇员集体谈判的两个最有力的理由是,它是反民主的,它阻碍了有效的政府。由于担心公共部门集体谈判的反民主影响,法院和劳工委员会缩小了必须谈判的范围。对集体谈判阻碍政府有效运作的担忧导致立法和行政部门对公共雇员工会的强烈反对。本文认为,由于担心公务员议价的反民主性质,议价范围的狭窄导致公务员议价阻碍了有效政府。可协商性法律使雇员及其工会不参与影响公共部门企业风险的决定并对其承担责任,而参与谈判保护他们免受这些风险的合同条款。公共雇员工会非常有效地发挥了这一作用,以至于其结果可能阻碍有效的政府。这篇文章审查了许多案例,在这些案例中,尽管有法律,公共雇主还是让雇员及其工会参与影响企业风险的决策,并取得了非常积极的结果。文章敦促司法管辖区摆脱私营部门模式,这种模式将每一个主题分类为强制集体谈判或留给管理层单方面控制的主题,并在公共部门决策中发展雇员工会声音的替代工具。
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The Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law
Although the percentage of employees represented in collective bargaining in the public sector is more than five times the percentage in the private sector, collective bargaining for public employees remains very controversial The two most powerful arguments against public employee collective bargaining is that it is antidemocratic and that it impedes effective government. Concern with the antidemocratic effects of public sector collective bargaining leads courts and labor boards to narrow the scope of what must be negotiated. Concerns with collective bargaining impeding effective government leads to backlash by the legislative and executive branches against public employee unions.This article contends that the narrowness of the scope of bargaining that results from concerns over the antidemocratic nature of public employee bargaining leads to public employee bargaining impeding effective government. The law of negotiability channels channels employees and their unions away from participation in and responsibility for decisions affecting the risks of the public sector enterprise and into negotiating contract provisions that protect them from those risks. Public employee unions have performed that role very effectively, so effectively that the results can impede effective government. The article examines numerous cases where, in spite of the law, public employers have involved employees and their unions in decisions affecting the risks of the enterprise with very positive results. The article urges that jurisdictions break away from the private sector model which classifies every subject as either one on which collective bargaining is mandated or which is left to the unilateral control of management and develop alternative vehicles of employee-union voice in public sector decision-making.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
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期刊介绍: Founded in 1925, the Indiana Law Journal is a general-interest academic legal journal. The Indiana Law Journal is published quarterly by students of the Indiana University Maurer School of Law — Bloomington. The opportunity to become a member of the Journal is available to all students at the end of their first-year. Members are selected in one of two ways. First, students in the top of their class academically are automatically invited to become members. Second, a blind-graded writing competition is held to fill the remaining slots. This competition tests students" Bluebook skills and legal writing ability. Overall, approximately thirty-five offers are extended each year. Candidates who accept their offers make a two-year commitment to the Journal.
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