莱特再谈一次麦肯锡

Q2 Arts and Humanities Logos and Episteme Pub Date : 2021-03-25 DOI:10.5840/LOGOS-EPISTEME20211215
S. Dierig
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在这篇文章中,Crispin Wright对解决所谓的麦肯锡悖论的各种尝试进行了重构和批判。在第一部分中,我反对Anthony Brueckner,认为Wright的解决方案确实要求在麦肯锡的论证中存在权证传递的失败。为此,本文重构了麦肯锡悖论的一种变体,即获得先验保证,并声称赖特对这一悖论的假定解决方案最好理解为利用了有关论证中存在传递失败的论点。在第二部分中,我将重点关注赖特在他2003年发表的关于麦肯锡悖论的关键文章的第二部分中的观点。有人认为,如果赖特的权利理论被接受,他提出的解决悖论的方法是令人信服的。然而,在第三部分,我对赖特关于权利的解释提出了异议。最后,在第四部分,莱特在他最近的一篇关于麦肯锡悖论的文章中的观点得到了检验。结果表明,他解决这个问题的新方法并不比他以前的尝试更好。
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Wright on McKinsey One More Time
In this essay, Crispin Wright’s various attempts at solving the so-called McKinsey paradox are reconstructed and criticized. In the first section, I argue against Anthony Brueckner that Wright’s solution does require that there is a failure of warrant transmission in McKinsey’s argument. To this end, a variant of the McKinsey paradox for earned a priori warrant is reconstructed, and it is claimed that Wright’s putative solution of this paradox is best understood as drawing on the contention that there is a transmission failure in the argument in question. In section II, I focus on Wright’s views in the second part of his pivotal article on the McKinsey paradox (published in 2003). It is argued that the solution to the paradox proposed there by Wright is convincing if his theory of entitlements is accepted. In the third section, however, I raise an objection against Wright’s account of entitlements. Finally, in section IV, Wright’s views in his most recent essay on the McKinsey paradox are examined. It is shown that his new solution to this problem does not work any better than his earlier attempts at solving it.
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来源期刊
Logos and Episteme
Logos and Episteme Arts and Humanities-Philosophy
CiteScore
0.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
10
审稿时长
20 weeks
期刊介绍: the journal publishes articles, reviews or discussion notes focused as well on problems concerning the general theory of knowledge, as on problems specific to the philosophy, methodology and ethics of science, philosophical logic, metaphilosophy, moral epistemology, epistemology of art, epistemology of religion, social or political epistemology, epistemology of communication. Studies in the history of science and of the philosophy of knowledge, or studies in the sociology of knowledge, cognitive psychology, and cognitive science are also welcome.
期刊最新文献
Logos and Episteme: Aims and Scope Notes on the Contributors Contextual Shifts and Gradable Knowledge Uniqueness and Logical Disagreement (Revisited) Subjective Rationality and the Reasoning Argument
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