自由意志,邪恶和圣奥古斯丁

IF 0.1 0 HUMANITIES, MULTIDISCIPLINARY Quaestiones Disputatae Pub Date : 2015-04-01 DOI:10.5840/QD20156127
Siobhan Nash-Marshall
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Neither the Ottoman soldier--who could coldly report detailed accounts of the Armenian death marches to the Ottoman Minister of the Interior--nor the Nazi officer--who could impassively watch the countless horrors that were being inflicted upon the victims of the Third Reich--were what we would readily call good people. Pontius Pilate is no one's hero. Nor does evil just cause us to feel pain when we ourselves are its victims, although again, it most certainly does and should do so. A person who does not suffer from that evil to which he is subjected is either inhuman or in denial, super-human or insane. The abused abductee who does not acknowledge that he is being abused by his abductors, and who does not feel the pain that should result from that abuse, suffers from what psychologists consider to be a form of localized insanity: the Stockholm syndrome or some variant thereof. Repressing pain is positively harmful. It too seems to be evil. 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引用次数: 1

摘要

邪恶是奥古斯丁“深深困扰的问题”。这对任何了解奥古斯丁的人来说都不足为奇。与柏拉图认为知识的目的是对永恒理念的沉思不同,奥古斯丁认为,我们应该在今生积极追求知识的主要原因之一是为了理解我们对这个世界的体验。我们在这个世界上的经历包括邪恶的经历。这一经历使我们大家深感不安。我们对邪恶的困扰不仅仅是情感上的。邪恶不只是使我们感到恐惧或震惊,尽管它确实也应该做到这两件事。对邪恶无动于衷本身似乎就是邪恶。奥斯曼士兵——他们可以冷酷地向奥斯曼内政部长报告亚美尼亚死亡行军的详细情况——和纳粹军官——他们可以无动于衷地看着第三帝国的受害者遭受的无数恐怖——都不是我们可以轻易称之为好人的人。本丢·彼拉多不是谁的英雄。当我们自己是邪恶的受害者时,邪恶也不会让我们感到痛苦,尽管它肯定会,也应该这样做。一个人如果不忍受他所遭受的邪恶,他要么是非人道的,要么是否认的,要么是超人,要么是疯子。受虐待的被绑架者如果不承认他正在被绑架者虐待,也不感到这种虐待应该造成的痛苦,那么他就患有心理学家认为是一种局部精神错乱:斯德哥尔摩综合症或其某种变体。压抑疼痛肯定是有害的。它似乎也是邪恶的。邪恶也是,甚至可能是最主要的,智力上的麻烦。当我们目睹它(或遭受它)时所感到的震惊表明,邪恶对我们来说是没有理智意义的。谋杀150万亚美尼亚人真的有理智吗?亚美尼亚大屠杀发生在1915年第一次世界大战期间,当时,奥斯曼帝国为了维护领土完整而参战,正与北方的俄罗斯人、南方的英国人和西方的法国人进行三线作战。这个帝国的领导人不派遣可以用于前线的军队,而不是屠杀自己的公民,这真的有意义吗?帝国的领袖们杀死那些在前线作战的身体健全的男性公民,这真的有意义吗?显然不是。回想起来,这简直是疯了。总的来说也是邪恶的。正是由于这些原因,两千多年来,邪恶一直困扰着哲学家们。从柏拉图到阿奎那,从奥卡姆到康德,每一位伟大的思想家都在与邪恶作斗争。问题并没有消失。汉娜·阿伦特声称,在大屠杀之后,邪恶将是所有哲学问题中最重要的问题。“邪恶的问题将是战后欧洲知识分子生活的根本问题,”她声称。事实上,邪恶一直是个大问题。关于邪恶有很多可说的。两千四百年的哲学探索产生了大量的思想;无数的理论和争论,子问题和分歧。在讨论邪恶时,哲学家们抱怨很难调和邪恶的存在与一个善良而全能的上帝的存在。有些人声称邪恶是上帝不存在的确凿证据。有些人声称,邪恶是人类本质邪恶的肯定证据。有些人声称,邪恶是宇宙中缺乏任何形式的终结的肯定证据。有些人声称,邪恶是人类理解荒谬的肯定证据。在这篇文章中,在奥古斯丁的帮助下,我想把注意力集中在这一系列问题的根源上。
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Free Will, Evil, and Saint Augustine
Evil was "a problem deeply troubling" to Augustine. This should come as no surprise to anyone who knows something about Augustine. Unlike Plato, who held that the purpose of knowledge is the contemplation of Eternal Ideas, Augustine held that one of the primary reasons why we should actively pursue knowledge in this life is to make sense of our experience of this world. Our experience of this world includes the experience of evil. This experience is deeply troubling to us all. The trouble that we have with evil is not just emotional. Evil does not just horrify us, or shock us, although it certainly does and should do both of these things. Being impassive to evil seems itself to be evil. Neither the Ottoman soldier--who could coldly report detailed accounts of the Armenian death marches to the Ottoman Minister of the Interior--nor the Nazi officer--who could impassively watch the countless horrors that were being inflicted upon the victims of the Third Reich--were what we would readily call good people. Pontius Pilate is no one's hero. Nor does evil just cause us to feel pain when we ourselves are its victims, although again, it most certainly does and should do so. A person who does not suffer from that evil to which he is subjected is either inhuman or in denial, super-human or insane. The abused abductee who does not acknowledge that he is being abused by his abductors, and who does not feel the pain that should result from that abuse, suffers from what psychologists consider to be a form of localized insanity: the Stockholm syndrome or some variant thereof. Repressing pain is positively harmful. It too seems to be evil. Evil is also, and perhaps even primarily, intellectually troubling. As the very shock that we feel when we witness it (or are subjected to it) indicates, evil makes no intellectual sense to us. Does murdering a million and a half Armenians really make intellectual sense? The Armenian Genocide took place in 1915, during World War I. At that time, the Ottoman Empire, which had entered the war in order to maintain its territorial integrity, was fighting a three front battle against the Russians to the north, the English to the south, and the French to the west. Did it really make sense for the leaders of that empire not just to commit troops that could have been used on those fronts, rather than massacring its own citizens? Did it really make sense for the leaders of that empire also to kill able bodied male citizens who would have fought on those fronts? Obviously not. In retrospect, it is positively insane. So too in general is evil. It is for all of these reasons that evil has haunted philosophers for over two thousand years. Every great thinker from Plato to Aquinas, from Ockham to Kant grappled with evil. The problem has not gone away. Hanna Arendt claimed that after the Holocaust evil would be the most significant of all philosophical problems. "The problem of evil will be the fundamental question of postwar intellectual life in Europe," she claimed. In truth, evil has always been the great problem. There is a lot to be said about evil. Two thousand four hundred years of philosophical inquiry make for a massive amount of thought; untold numbers of theories and debates, sub-problems and disagreement. In their discussions of evil, philosophers have complained about the difficulty of reconciling the existence of evil with the existence of a good and omnipotent God. Some have claimed that evil is proof positive of the non-existence of God. Some have claimed that evil is proof positive of the essential wickedness of human beings. Some have claimed that evil is proof positive of the lack of any sort of finality in the universe. Some have claimed that evil is proof positive of the absurdity of human understanding. In this essay I want, with the help of Augustine, to concentrate on the root of that cluster of problems that come under the...
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Quaestiones Disputatae
Quaestiones Disputatae HUMANITIES, MULTIDISCIPLINARY-
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