垂直结构下的质量选择:杂货零售业中的国家品牌与自有品牌。

P. Fousekis
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引用次数: 8

摘要

本文分析了垄断食品制造商(国家品牌nb生产商)和垄断零售商同时供应国家品牌和自有品牌(PL)的垂直结构下的质量选择。该分析基于一个三阶段动态博弈。根据结果,在纳什均衡中,两个参与者为他们的产品选择最大可能的质量。这意味着B食品制造商寻求最大的产品差异化,而LP零售商寻求最小的产品差异化。这两个参与者的行为似乎与食品市场的实际发展以及早期的实证研究一致,这些研究记录了NB食品制造商为增加产品差异化所做的努力。
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Quality choices in a vertical structure: national brands vs private labels in grocery retailing.
The paper analyzes quality choices in a vertical structure involving a monopolist food manufacturer (national brand-NB producer) and a monopolist retailer supplying both the national brand as well as a private label (PL). The analysis is based on a threestage dynamic game. According to the results, in the Nash equilibrium the two players choose the maximum possible qualities for their products. This means that the B food manufacturer seeks the maximum product differentiation, while the LP retailer seeks the minimum product differentiation. The behavior of the two players appears to be consistent with actual developments in the food markets as well as with earlier empirical studies documenting the efforts of NB food manufacturers to increase product differentiation.
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