{"title":"分析师所属机构交易行为的变化:全球分析师研究结算的影响","authors":"Hyoseok (David) Hwang","doi":"10.1111/fmii.12142","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines the impact of the Global Analyst Research Settlement (GS) on the trading behavior of analyst-affiliated institutions. Using firms with securities class actions, I find that analyst-affiliated institutions reduce their stockholdings of sued firms prior to their own analyst downgrades, which supports a front-running hypothesis. This front-running trading behavior of analyst-affiliated institutions diminishes for sanctioned institutions after the GS. However, the informed trading behavior of the analyst-affiliated institutions remains strong for non-sanctioned institutions, implying that the Global Settlement could not impede non-sanctioned institutions from front-running trading activities. This study suggests more regulatory actions are needed to prevent analyst-affiliated institutions’ misconduct.</p>","PeriodicalId":39670,"journal":{"name":"Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments","volume":"30 3","pages":"65-83"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/fmii.12142","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Changes in trading behavior of analyst-affiliated institutions: the impact of the global analyst research settlement\",\"authors\":\"Hyoseok (David) Hwang\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/fmii.12142\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>This paper examines the impact of the Global Analyst Research Settlement (GS) on the trading behavior of analyst-affiliated institutions. Using firms with securities class actions, I find that analyst-affiliated institutions reduce their stockholdings of sued firms prior to their own analyst downgrades, which supports a front-running hypothesis. This front-running trading behavior of analyst-affiliated institutions diminishes for sanctioned institutions after the GS. However, the informed trading behavior of the analyst-affiliated institutions remains strong for non-sanctioned institutions, implying that the Global Settlement could not impede non-sanctioned institutions from front-running trading activities. This study suggests more regulatory actions are needed to prevent analyst-affiliated institutions’ misconduct.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":39670,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments\",\"volume\":\"30 3\",\"pages\":\"65-83\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-04-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/fmii.12142\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/fmii.12142\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"Economics, Econometrics and Finance\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/fmii.12142","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"Economics, Econometrics and Finance","Score":null,"Total":0}
Changes in trading behavior of analyst-affiliated institutions: the impact of the global analyst research settlement
This paper examines the impact of the Global Analyst Research Settlement (GS) on the trading behavior of analyst-affiliated institutions. Using firms with securities class actions, I find that analyst-affiliated institutions reduce their stockholdings of sued firms prior to their own analyst downgrades, which supports a front-running hypothesis. This front-running trading behavior of analyst-affiliated institutions diminishes for sanctioned institutions after the GS. However, the informed trading behavior of the analyst-affiliated institutions remains strong for non-sanctioned institutions, implying that the Global Settlement could not impede non-sanctioned institutions from front-running trading activities. This study suggests more regulatory actions are needed to prevent analyst-affiliated institutions’ misconduct.
期刊介绍：
Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments bridges the gap between the academic and professional finance communities. With contributions from leading academics, as well as practitioners from organizations such as the SEC and the Federal Reserve, the journal is equally relevant to both groups. Each issue is devoted to a single topic, which is examined in depth, and a special fifth issue is published annually highlighting the most significant developments in money and banking, derivative securities, corporate finance, and fixed-income securities.
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