没有知识的怀疑主义——归因

Q2 Arts and Humanities Logos and Episteme Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI:10.5840/logos-episteme202011211
Aaran Burns
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引用次数: 0

摘要

怀疑论者会说“没有人知道任何事情”,“没有人知道他们有手”,“当他们不看桌子的时候,没有人知道桌子的存在”。根据最近许多反怀疑论者的观点,怀疑论者指的是否认普通知识的归因。这样理解的话,怀疑论者就容易受到环境主义者和外在主义者的指责,怀疑论者不理解"知识"这个词通常的用法。在本文中,我区分了一种形式的怀疑主义,它与普通知识的真理性属性相容,从而避免了这些批评。我也为这种怀疑主义辩护,反对那种认为它在哲学上无趣或无足轻重的说法。
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Scepticism without Knowledge-Attributions
The sceptic says things like “nobody knows anything at all,” “nobody knows that they have hands,” and “nobody knows that the table exists when they aren't looking at it.” According to many recent anti-sceptics, the sceptic means to deny ordinary knowledge attributions. Understood this way, the sceptic is open to the charge, made often by Contextualists and Externalists, that he doesn't understand the way that the word “knowledge” is ordinarily used. In this paper, I distinguish a form of Scepticism that is compatible with the truth of ordinary knowledge attributions and therefore avoids these criticisms. I also defend that kind of Scepticism against the suggestion that it is philosophically uninteresting or insignificant.
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来源期刊
Logos and Episteme
Logos and Episteme Arts and Humanities-Philosophy
CiteScore
0.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
10
审稿时长
20 weeks
期刊介绍: the journal publishes articles, reviews or discussion notes focused as well on problems concerning the general theory of knowledge, as on problems specific to the philosophy, methodology and ethics of science, philosophical logic, metaphilosophy, moral epistemology, epistemology of art, epistemology of religion, social or political epistemology, epistemology of communication. Studies in the history of science and of the philosophy of knowledge, or studies in the sociology of knowledge, cognitive psychology, and cognitive science are also welcome.
期刊最新文献
Logos and Episteme: Aims and Scope Notes on the Contributors Contextual Shifts and Gradable Knowledge Uniqueness and Logical Disagreement (Revisited) Subjective Rationality and the Reasoning Argument
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