{"title":"没有知识的怀疑主义——归因","authors":"Aaran Burns","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme202011211","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The sceptic says things like “nobody knows anything at all,” “nobody knows that they have hands,” and “nobody knows that the table exists when they aren't looking at it.” According to many recent anti-sceptics, the sceptic means to deny ordinary knowledge attributions. Understood this way, the sceptic is open to the charge, made often by Contextualists and Externalists, that he doesn't understand the way that the word “knowledge” is ordinarily used. In this paper, I distinguish a form of Scepticism that is compatible with the truth of ordinary knowledge attributions and therefore avoids these criticisms. I also defend that kind of Scepticism against the suggestion that it is philosophically uninteresting or insignificant.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":"6 1","pages":"133-148"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Scepticism without Knowledge-Attributions\",\"authors\":\"Aaran Burns\",\"doi\":\"10.5840/logos-episteme202011211\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The sceptic says things like “nobody knows anything at all,” “nobody knows that they have hands,” and “nobody knows that the table exists when they aren't looking at it.” According to many recent anti-sceptics, the sceptic means to deny ordinary knowledge attributions. Understood this way, the sceptic is open to the charge, made often by Contextualists and Externalists, that he doesn't understand the way that the word “knowledge” is ordinarily used. In this paper, I distinguish a form of Scepticism that is compatible with the truth of ordinary knowledge attributions and therefore avoids these criticisms. I also defend that kind of Scepticism against the suggestion that it is philosophically uninteresting or insignificant.\",\"PeriodicalId\":37720,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Logos and Episteme\",\"volume\":\"6 1\",\"pages\":\"133-148\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Logos and Episteme\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202011211\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"Arts and Humanities\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Logos and Episteme","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202011211","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
The sceptic says things like “nobody knows anything at all,” “nobody knows that they have hands,” and “nobody knows that the table exists when they aren't looking at it.” According to many recent anti-sceptics, the sceptic means to deny ordinary knowledge attributions. Understood this way, the sceptic is open to the charge, made often by Contextualists and Externalists, that he doesn't understand the way that the word “knowledge” is ordinarily used. In this paper, I distinguish a form of Scepticism that is compatible with the truth of ordinary knowledge attributions and therefore avoids these criticisms. I also defend that kind of Scepticism against the suggestion that it is philosophically uninteresting or insignificant.
期刊介绍:
the journal publishes articles, reviews or discussion notes focused as well on problems concerning the general theory of knowledge, as on problems specific to the philosophy, methodology and ethics of science, philosophical logic, metaphilosophy, moral epistemology, epistemology of art, epistemology of religion, social or political epistemology, epistemology of communication. Studies in the history of science and of the philosophy of knowledge, or studies in the sociology of knowledge, cognitive psychology, and cognitive science are also welcome.