解决严重危害,重新考虑政策,朝着修复方向建设

Rine Vieth
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引用次数: 0

摘要

这篇评论引用了我的个人经历、我花时间与积极分子讨论学术界的伤害行为,以及对各种学术伤害和责任问题的回顾。在过去的几年里,我观察到了许多引人注目的人类学案例——在不同的国家和不同的背景下——这些案例引起了公众的重大反应。有些人将这种伤害框定为众所周知的“少数坏苹果”,我反对这种方法,因为它忽略了造成伤害的原因。另外,一些人试图用“学术自由”的概念来回避人际关系义务的问题。最近,我在一些针对约翰·科马罗夫(John Comaroff)指控的辩护中遇到了这种观点,比如我注意到后来在他自己的网站上交叉发布的媒体文章(Comaroff 2022;沃尔什2022)。在这里,我没有陷入一场关于什么是“学术自由”或什么不是“学术自由”的辩论,而是强调一种不同的重新定位,一种框架的转变:我在与朋友和合作者的交谈中称之为“学术责任”。这提醒我们,虽然学术自由经常被定义为自由或自由,但学术责任强调的是我们作为学者的责任以及随之而来的对他人的义务。这包括拒绝佐伊·托德(2019)所说的“想象力的失败”——我们可以而且必须设想不同的方式来构建我们自己在学术界所看到或经历的学术空间。
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Addressing Serious Harm, Reconsidering Policy and Building Towards Repair
This commentary draws on personal experiences, my time spent discussing acts of harm in the academy with activists, and a review of various incidences on issues of academic harm and responsibility. Over the last few years, I have observed numerous high-profile cases in anthropology – in various countries and various contexts – that have elicited a significant public response. Some frame this kind of harm as the proverbial ‘few bad apples’, an approach I reject as it ignores what enables harm. Alternatively, some attempt to use the idea of ‘academic freedom’ as a way to sidestep questions of interpersonal obligations. Recently, I have encountered this line of argument in defences made by some against allegations about John Comaroff, such as media pieces that I note have been later cross-posted to his own website (Comaroff 2022; Walsh 2022). Instead of settling into a debate about what is or is not ‘academic freedom’, I here highlight a different reorientation, a shift in framing: what I have called, in conversations with friends and collaborators, ‘academic responsibility’. This reminds us that whereas academic freedom is frequently framed as a freedom to or a freedom from, academic responsibility emphasises our responsibilities as scholars and the obligations which follow to others. This includes a refusal of what Zoe Todd (2019) calls a ‘failure of imagination’ – we can and must envision different ways of building scholarly spaces beyond what we ourselves have seen or experienced in the academy.
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审稿时长
12 weeks
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