{"title":"税务案件的举证责任:估价与幅度-最新进展","authors":"John A. Townsend","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3489925","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this Article, the author discusses the difficulty in many valuation cases of determining a definite valuation point by the required degree of persuasion (more likely than not in most civil cases). This point was made cogently in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., a frequently cited opinion by the Delaware Court of Chancery, a forum for significant litigation involving corporate valuations: \n \n[I]t is one of the conceits of our law that we purport to declare something as elusive as the fair value of an entity on a given date. . . . [V]aluation decisions are impossible to make with anything approaching complete confidence. Valuing an entity is a difficult intellectual exercise, especially when business and financial experts are able to organize data in support of wildly divergent valuations for the same entity. For a judge who is not an expert in corporate finance, one can do little more than try to detect gross distortions in the experts’ opinions. This effort should, therefore, not be understood, as a matter of intellectual honesty, as resulting in the fair value of a corporation on a given date. The value of a corporation is not a point on a line, but a range of reasonable values, and the judge’s task is to assign one particular value within this range as the most reasonable value in light of all the relevant evidence and based on considerations of fairness. \n \nCorporate valuations for estate tax are just one context of tax litigation, but there are many other contexts. A prominent example for some time now has been transfer pricing. \n \nSometimes when ranges are identified, arbitrary conventions (such as the midpoint in trades as in the case of publicly-traded stock) can be used to determine the value in tax litigation. But when there is no such convention that should be applied, the burden of persuasion can resolve the valuation issue by identifying the range. The party bearing the burden of persuasion (or risk of non-persuasion) then has persuaded only as to the end of the range that does not favor that party; the value, based on persuasion, is determined accordingly. \n \nThe party bearing the burden of persuasion in tax cases is usually the taxpayer. In this Article, the author discusses interesting features of the burden and how, at least before the Tax Court, the burden of persuasion might shift to the Service under the Supreme Court’s decision in Helvering v. Taylor, which the author urges is often misunderstood. \n \nAnother benefit of identifying a range of values is that, if it is determined on appeal that the trier of fact misapplied the burden of persuasion but did identify the range, the court of appeals can resolve the case by picking the other end of the range (unless a successful attack is made on the trial court’s choice for the ends of the range).","PeriodicalId":54058,"journal":{"name":"EJournal of Tax Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2019-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Burden of Proof in Tax Cases: Valuation and Ranges — An Update\",\"authors\":\"John A. Townsend\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3489925\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In this Article, the author discusses the difficulty in many valuation cases of determining a definite valuation point by the required degree of persuasion (more likely than not in most civil cases). This point was made cogently in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., a frequently cited opinion by the Delaware Court of Chancery, a forum for significant litigation involving corporate valuations: \\n \\n[I]t is one of the conceits of our law that we purport to declare something as elusive as the fair value of an entity on a given date. . . . [V]aluation decisions are impossible to make with anything approaching complete confidence. Valuing an entity is a difficult intellectual exercise, especially when business and financial experts are able to organize data in support of wildly divergent valuations for the same entity. For a judge who is not an expert in corporate finance, one can do little more than try to detect gross distortions in the experts’ opinions. This effort should, therefore, not be understood, as a matter of intellectual honesty, as resulting in the fair value of a corporation on a given date. The value of a corporation is not a point on a line, but a range of reasonable values, and the judge’s task is to assign one particular value within this range as the most reasonable value in light of all the relevant evidence and based on considerations of fairness. \\n \\nCorporate valuations for estate tax are just one context of tax litigation, but there are many other contexts. A prominent example for some time now has been transfer pricing. \\n \\nSometimes when ranges are identified, arbitrary conventions (such as the midpoint in trades as in the case of publicly-traded stock) can be used to determine the value in tax litigation. But when there is no such convention that should be applied, the burden of persuasion can resolve the valuation issue by identifying the range. The party bearing the burden of persuasion (or risk of non-persuasion) then has persuaded only as to the end of the range that does not favor that party; the value, based on persuasion, is determined accordingly. \\n \\nThe party bearing the burden of persuasion in tax cases is usually the taxpayer. In this Article, the author discusses interesting features of the burden and how, at least before the Tax Court, the burden of persuasion might shift to the Service under the Supreme Court’s decision in Helvering v. Taylor, which the author urges is often misunderstood. \\n \\nAnother benefit of identifying a range of values is that, if it is determined on appeal that the trier of fact misapplied the burden of persuasion but did identify the range, the court of appeals can resolve the case by picking the other end of the range (unless a successful attack is made on the trial court’s choice for the ends of the range).\",\"PeriodicalId\":54058,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"EJournal of Tax Research\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-11-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"EJournal of Tax Research\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3489925\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"EJournal of Tax Research","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3489925","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
在本文中,作者讨论了在许多估价案件中,通过所需的说服程度来确定确定的估价点的困难(在大多数民事案件中更有可能)。这一点在Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.一案中得到了有力的阐述,这是特拉华州衡平法院(一个涉及公司估值的重大诉讼的论坛)经常引用的一项意见:[I]我们的法律的一个设想是,我们声称要宣布一个实体在给定日期的公允价值这样难以捉摸的东西. . . .[V]评估决策是不可能在任何接近完全自信的情况下做出的。对一个实体进行估值是一项困难的智力练习,尤其是当商业和金融专家能够组织数据,以支持对同一实体的截然不同的估值时。对于一个不是公司财务专家的法官来说,除了试图发现专家意见中的严重扭曲之外,他能做的也不多。因此,这种努力不应被理解为智力上的诚实,不应被理解为在给定日期得出一家公司的公允价值。公司的价值不是一条线上的一个点,而是一个合理的价值范围,法官的任务是根据所有相关证据并基于公平考虑,在这个范围内指定一个特定的价值作为最合理的价值。遗产税的公司估值只是税务诉讼的一种情况,但还有许多其他情况。一段时间以来,一个突出的例子就是转让定价。有时,当范围确定时,可以使用任意约定(例如公开交易股票的交易中点)来确定税务诉讼中的价值。但是,当不存在这种应适用的惯例时,说服责任可以通过确定范围来解决估值问题。承担说服责任(或不说服风险)的一方只说服了不利于该方的范围的末端;基于说服的价值是相应确定的。在税务案件中承担说服责任的一方通常是纳税人。在本文中,作者讨论了责任的有趣特征,以及至少在税务法院之前,根据最高法院对Helvering v. Taylor的判决,说服的责任如何转移到服务部门,作者认为这经常被误解。确定价值范围的另一个好处是,如果在上诉中确定事实审判官滥用了说服责任,但确实确定了范围,上诉法院可以通过选择范围的另一端来解决案件(除非对初审法院选择的范围的末端进行了成功的攻击)。
Burden of Proof in Tax Cases: Valuation and Ranges — An Update
In this Article, the author discusses the difficulty in many valuation cases of determining a definite valuation point by the required degree of persuasion (more likely than not in most civil cases). This point was made cogently in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., a frequently cited opinion by the Delaware Court of Chancery, a forum for significant litigation involving corporate valuations:
[I]t is one of the conceits of our law that we purport to declare something as elusive as the fair value of an entity on a given date. . . . [V]aluation decisions are impossible to make with anything approaching complete confidence. Valuing an entity is a difficult intellectual exercise, especially when business and financial experts are able to organize data in support of wildly divergent valuations for the same entity. For a judge who is not an expert in corporate finance, one can do little more than try to detect gross distortions in the experts’ opinions. This effort should, therefore, not be understood, as a matter of intellectual honesty, as resulting in the fair value of a corporation on a given date. The value of a corporation is not a point on a line, but a range of reasonable values, and the judge’s task is to assign one particular value within this range as the most reasonable value in light of all the relevant evidence and based on considerations of fairness.
Corporate valuations for estate tax are just one context of tax litigation, but there are many other contexts. A prominent example for some time now has been transfer pricing.
Sometimes when ranges are identified, arbitrary conventions (such as the midpoint in trades as in the case of publicly-traded stock) can be used to determine the value in tax litigation. But when there is no such convention that should be applied, the burden of persuasion can resolve the valuation issue by identifying the range. The party bearing the burden of persuasion (or risk of non-persuasion) then has persuaded only as to the end of the range that does not favor that party; the value, based on persuasion, is determined accordingly.
The party bearing the burden of persuasion in tax cases is usually the taxpayer. In this Article, the author discusses interesting features of the burden and how, at least before the Tax Court, the burden of persuasion might shift to the Service under the Supreme Court’s decision in Helvering v. Taylor, which the author urges is often misunderstood.
Another benefit of identifying a range of values is that, if it is determined on appeal that the trier of fact misapplied the burden of persuasion but did identify the range, the court of appeals can resolve the case by picking the other end of the range (unless a successful attack is made on the trial court’s choice for the ends of the range).