{"title":"银行和家庭如何管理利率风险?来自抵押贷款申请和银行回应的证据","authors":"Christoph Basten, B. Guin, Cathérine Koch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3192943","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We exploit a unique dataset that features both un-intermediated mortgage requests and independent responses from multiple banks to each request. We show that households typically are not prudent risk managers, but prioritize minimizing current mortgage payments over insurance against future rate increases. Contrary to assumptions in the previous literature, we find that banks do also influence contracted rate fixation periods. They trade off their own exposure to interest rate risk against household requests and against credit risk.","PeriodicalId":12014,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Microeconometric Studies of Housing Markets (Topic)","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"9","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"How Do Banks and Households Manage Interest Rate Risk? Evidence from Mortgage Applications and Banks’ Responses\",\"authors\":\"Christoph Basten, B. Guin, Cathérine Koch\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3192943\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We exploit a unique dataset that features both un-intermediated mortgage requests and independent responses from multiple banks to each request. We show that households typically are not prudent risk managers, but prioritize minimizing current mortgage payments over insurance against future rate increases. Contrary to assumptions in the previous literature, we find that banks do also influence contracted rate fixation periods. They trade off their own exposure to interest rate risk against household requests and against credit risk.\",\"PeriodicalId\":12014,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Microeconometric Studies of Housing Markets (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"12 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-06-08\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"9\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Microeconometric Studies of Housing Markets (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3192943\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Microeconometric Studies of Housing Markets (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3192943","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
How Do Banks and Households Manage Interest Rate Risk? Evidence from Mortgage Applications and Banks’ Responses
We exploit a unique dataset that features both un-intermediated mortgage requests and independent responses from multiple banks to each request. We show that households typically are not prudent risk managers, but prioritize minimizing current mortgage payments over insurance against future rate increases. Contrary to assumptions in the previous literature, we find that banks do also influence contracted rate fixation periods. They trade off their own exposure to interest rate risk against household requests and against credit risk.