应用隔离:仅用一个浏览器即可获得多个浏览器的安全性

E. Chen, Jason Bau, C. Reis, A. Barth, Collin Jackson
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引用次数: 66

摘要

许多基于浏览器的攻击可以通过为不同的网站使用不同的浏览器来防止。然而,大多数用户只使用一个浏览器访问web。我们从两个概念来解释使用多个浏览器带来的安全好处:入口点限制和状态隔离。我们将这些概念组合成一个通用的应用隔离机制,可以在单个浏览器中提供相同的安全优势。虽然并不适用于所有类型的网站,但许多拥有高价值用户数据的网站可以选择应用程序隔离,以防御各种基于浏览器的攻击。我们在Chromium浏览器中实现应用隔离,并使用有限状态模型检查来验证其安全属性。我们还测量了应用程序隔离的性能开销,并进行了大规模的研究,以评估其在不同类型站点上的采用复杂性,展示了应用程序隔离机制如何适合于保护许多高价值的Web应用程序,例如在线银行。
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App isolation: get the security of multiple browsers with just one
Many browser-based attacks can be prevented by using separate browsers for separate web sites. However, most users access the web with only one browser. We explain the security benefits that using multiple browsers provides in terms of two concepts: entry-point restriction and state isolation. We combine these concepts into a general app isolation mechanism that can provide the same security benefits in a single browser. While not appropriate for all types of web sites, many sites with high-value user data can opt in to app isolation to gain defenses against a wide variety of browser-based attacks. We implement app isolation in the Chromium browser and verify its security properties using finite-state model checking. We also measure the performance overhead of app isolation and conduct a large-scale study to evaluate its adoption complexity for various types of sites, demonstrating how the app isolation mechanisms are suitable for protecting a number of high-value Web applications, such as online banking.
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CiteScore
9.20
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