潜能作为属性

IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Philosophical Inquiries Pub Date : 2020-03-31 DOI:10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I1.279
J. Mckitrick
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在《潜能:从倾向到情态》一书中,芭芭拉·维特试图将情态建立在她称之为“潜能”的属性中。电位是否能完成这项任务取决于属性是什么。然而,主要的性质形而上学的说法,如类唯名论、比喻论、内在实在论、柏拉图主义,都与维特关于潜能的主张不相容。然而,一种修改后的潜力解释可能与内在实在论或修辞唯名论相容。
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Potentialities as properties
In Potentiality: From Dispositions to Modality , Barbara Vetter attempts to ground modality in properties that she calls “potentialities”. Whether potentialities are up to this task depends on what properties are. However, major accounts of the metaphysics of properties, such as Class Nominalism, Trope Theory, Immanent Realism, Platonism, are incompatible with Vetter’s claims about potentialities. Nevertheless, a modified account of potentialities might be compatible with Immanent Realism or Trope Nominalism.
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