如何饿死野兽:财政和货币政策规则

IF 2.9 4区 经济学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Review Pub Date : 2019-10-11 DOI:10.20955/wp.2019.026
F. Martin
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引用次数: 1

摘要

社会已经开始依靠简单的规则来限制政府的规模和行为:对货币政策、收入、预算平衡和债务的限制。我在一个财政和货币政策共同决定的动态随机模型中研究了这些约束的优点。在几种规格下,收入上限是唯一能有效诱导政府降低支出并在福利方面主导其他政策约束的规则。然而,支出的减少幅度不大,而且是以更高的债务和通胀为代价的。货币政策规则是不可取的,因为它们严重阻碍了扭曲平滑,如果执行不当可能导致巨大的福利损失。预算平衡和债务规则通常是良性的,前者总是比后者更可取。所有类型的财政规则通常在任何时候都是最好的,但在不利时期可以暂停,通常代价很小。
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How to Starve the Beast: Fiscal and Monetary Policy Rules
Societies have come to rely on simple rules to restrict the size and behavior of governments: constraints on monetary policy, revenue, budget balance and debt. I study the merit of these constraints in a dynamic stochastic model in which fiscal and monetary policies are jointly determined. Under several specifications, a revenue ceiling is the only rule that effectively induces the government to lower spending and dominates other policy constraints in terms of welfare by an order of magnitude. However, the reduction in spending is modest and comes at the cost of higher debt and inflation. Monetary policy rules are not desirable as they severely hinder distortion-smoothing and may lead to large welfare losses if implemented incorrectly. Budget balance and debt rules are generally benign, with the former being always preferable to the latter. All types of fiscal rules are usually best implemented at all times, but can be suspended in adverse times, often at a minor cost.
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CiteScore
3.20
自引率
5.90%
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