可否认群聊的划时代签名

Andreas Hülsing, F. Weber
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引用次数: 5

摘要

在本文中,我们将正式研究群聊天应用程序中的可否认性,并引入“划时代签名”的概念,该概念允许将许多安全的群聊天协议转变为可否认协议。直观地说,转换适用于使用签名进行身份验证的协议,如果删除签名,这些协议将变得不可否认。与之前使用签名进行实体身份验证的提议(如mpOTR (CCS ' 09))相比,我们的构造不需要对参与者建立配对密钥,并且允许添加和删除参与者,而无需重新初始化聊天。这些属性允许在协议中进行部署,这些协议也被设计为可扩展到非常大的组。最后,利用泛型原语构造了一个实用的时代签名方案,并证明了该方案的安全性。
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Epochal Signatures for Deniable Group Chats
In this work we take a formal look at deniability in group chat applications and introduce the concept of "epochal signatures" that allows to turn many secure group chat protocols into deniable ones. Intuitively, the transform works for protocols that use signatures for authentication and that become deniable if the signatures are removed. In contrast to previous proposals that use signatures for entity authentication, like mpOTR (CCS’09), our construction does not require pairwise key establishment of participants and allows to add and remove participants without requiring to re-initialize the chat. These properties allow the deployment in protocols that are also designed to scale to very large groups. Finally, we construct a practical epochal signature scheme from generic primitives and prove it secure.
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