拒绝给定:关于方法论唯我论的神经和卡尔纳普

T. Uebel
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文研究了认识论的教义是如何长期与经验主义和实证主义联系在一起的,并为卡尔纳普1928年的第一部主要作品提供了信息,但在随后的几年里,纽拉特和卡尔纳普对其提出了挑战和克服。特别关注的是纽拉特和卡尔纳普之间的辩证法是如何准确地发挥出来的这一有争议的问题:纽拉特的论证是否正确地与卡尔纳普的实际立场相一致,卡尔纳普的立场变化是否反过来与纽拉特的挑战相一致,以及所有这些都可能告诉我们他们的哲学项目的兼容性。
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Rejecting the Given: Neurath and Carnap on Methodological Solipsism
This article investigates how the doctrine of the epistemological given—long associated with empiricism and positivism and also informing Carnap’s first major work in 1928—was challenged and overcome by Neurath and Carnap in subsequent years. Particular attention is paid to the controversial issue of how precisely the dialectic between Neurath and Carnap played out: whether Neurath’s argumentation correctly engaged with Carnap’s actual positions, whether Carnap’s change of positions in turn fully engaged with Neurath’s challenge, and what all this may tell us about the compatibility of their philosophical projects.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
25
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