为什么法规(EC) No 1/2003只规定对承诺实施处罚?历史的视角

IF 0.7 Q2 LAW World Competition Pub Date : 2022-06-01 DOI:10.54648/woco2022008
Walter Mölls
{"title":"为什么法规(EC) No 1/2003只规定对承诺实施处罚?历史的视角","authors":"Walter Mölls","doi":"10.54648/woco2022008","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"According to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, the Commission may impose any fines for the breach of substantive competition rules only on ‘undertakings’. The provision does not contemplate the imposition of fines on individuals considered responsible for the conduct of the undertaking concerned, even though, as explained in this article, this position is not imposed by the relevant legal basis (Article 83 EC [the Treaty establishing the European Community in the version following the Treaty of Amsterdam], corresponding to Article 87 EEC Treaty [the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community in its version of 1957] and the present Article 103 TFEU [the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union]) That legal basis would indeed allow such liability to be established. From a policy point of view, however, it is often argued that sanctions should also be imposed on such individuals. This raises the question as to why the Union legislator chose not to provide for corresponding powers on the Commission’s part. From the relevant legislative history exposed in this article, it emerges that the approach of Article 23(2)(a) ultimately originates from the ECSC Treaty [theTreaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community]. In this latter context, it reflected the particular limits placed by its authors on that Treaty. It did not reflect the contemporary orientations at national level regarding punitive sanctions. The approach gradually found its way into Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 without any further specific discussion on the way, despite the different context offered by the relevant provisions of the EEC/EC Treaty. It was first transplanted into Regulation No 11, based on Article 79 EEC Treaty (today Article 95 TFEU) and concerning the abolition of discrimination in transport rates and conditions. The negotiations preceding the adoption of this Regulation brought to light strong reserves regarding the conferral of sanctioning powers upon the (then) EEC, and it was no doubt unrealistic to expect that it would have been granted powers more far-reaching than those available under the ECSC Treaty. When Regulation No 17 (and specifically Article 15) was elaborated, the drafters were aware of the scheme established by Regulation No 11, which served as a reference. No genuine discussion regarding possible powers to punish the persons considered responsible for the conduct of the ‘undertaking’ took place. It is likely that any such innovation would not have been realistic at that point. Lastly, the reform brought about by Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 focused on other aspects regarding the implementation of competition law, and the scheme of Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 has been taken over into Article 23(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2013 without major changes. No consideration was given to the possible imposition of penalties on natural persons implicated in the commission of breaches of competition law.\nEU antitrust sanctions, European Commission, individual sanctions, Regulation No. 1/ 2003, Regulation No 17, Regulation No 11, ECSC Treaty, history","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Why Does Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 Provide for the Imposition of Penalties Only on Undertakings?: A Historical Perspective\",\"authors\":\"Walter Mölls\",\"doi\":\"10.54648/woco2022008\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"According to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, the Commission may impose any fines for the breach of substantive competition rules only on ‘undertakings’. The provision does not contemplate the imposition of fines on individuals considered responsible for the conduct of the undertaking concerned, even though, as explained in this article, this position is not imposed by the relevant legal basis (Article 83 EC [the Treaty establishing the European Community in the version following the Treaty of Amsterdam], corresponding to Article 87 EEC Treaty [the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community in its version of 1957] and the present Article 103 TFEU [the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union]) That legal basis would indeed allow such liability to be established. From a policy point of view, however, it is often argued that sanctions should also be imposed on such individuals. This raises the question as to why the Union legislator chose not to provide for corresponding powers on the Commission’s part. From the relevant legislative history exposed in this article, it emerges that the approach of Article 23(2)(a) ultimately originates from the ECSC Treaty [theTreaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community]. In this latter context, it reflected the particular limits placed by its authors on that Treaty. It did not reflect the contemporary orientations at national level regarding punitive sanctions. The approach gradually found its way into Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 without any further specific discussion on the way, despite the different context offered by the relevant provisions of the EEC/EC Treaty. It was first transplanted into Regulation No 11, based on Article 79 EEC Treaty (today Article 95 TFEU) and concerning the abolition of discrimination in transport rates and conditions. The negotiations preceding the adoption of this Regulation brought to light strong reserves regarding the conferral of sanctioning powers upon the (then) EEC, and it was no doubt unrealistic to expect that it would have been granted powers more far-reaching than those available under the ECSC Treaty. When Regulation No 17 (and specifically Article 15) was elaborated, the drafters were aware of the scheme established by Regulation No 11, which served as a reference. No genuine discussion regarding possible powers to punish the persons considered responsible for the conduct of the ‘undertaking’ took place. It is likely that any such innovation would not have been realistic at that point. Lastly, the reform brought about by Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 focused on other aspects regarding the implementation of competition law, and the scheme of Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 has been taken over into Article 23(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2013 without major changes. No consideration was given to the possible imposition of penalties on natural persons implicated in the commission of breaches of competition law.\\nEU antitrust sanctions, European Commission, individual sanctions, Regulation No. 1/ 2003, Regulation No 17, Regulation No 11, ECSC Treaty, history\",\"PeriodicalId\":43861,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"World Competition\",\"volume\":\"32 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"World Competition\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2022008\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"World Competition","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2022008","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

根据法规(EC) No 1/2003第23(2)(a)条,委员会只能对“承诺”处以违反实质性竞争规则的罚款。这项规定并不打算对被认为对有关事业的行为负有责任的个人处以罚款,尽管如本条所解释的,这种立场并不是由有关的法律依据所规定的(欧共体第83条[《阿姆斯特丹条约》之后的《建立欧洲共同体条约》],对应于《欧洲经济共同体条约》第87条[1957年版建立欧洲经济共同体的条约]和现行的《欧洲联盟运作条约》第103条],该法律基础确实允许建立这种责任。然而,从政策的角度来看,经常有人认为也应该对这些个人实施制裁。这就提出了一个问题,即为什么联盟立法者选择不规定委员会的相应权力。从本文所揭示的相关立法历史中可以看出,第23(2)(a)条的方法最终源于ECSC条约[建立欧洲煤钢共同体条约]。在后一种情况下,它反映了其作者对该《条约》所作的特殊限制。它没有反映当前国家一级关于惩罚性制裁的方针。尽管EEC/EC条约的相关条款提供了不同的背景,但这种方法在没有进一步具体讨论的情况下逐渐进入了(EC) No 1/2003法规。它首先被移植到第11号条例中,该条例基于《欧洲经济共同体条约》第79条(今天的《欧洲经济共同体条约》第95条),涉及取消运输费率和条件方面的歧视。本条例通过之前的谈判表明,在授予(当时的)欧共体制裁权力方面存在强烈的保留意见,期望欧共体获得比《欧共体条约》所赋予的更广泛的权力无疑是不现实的。在阐述第17号条例(特别是第15条)时,起草者知道第11号条例所建立的方案,这可以作为参考。关于惩罚被认为对“承诺”行为负有责任的人的可能权力,没有进行真正的讨论。在那个时候,任何这样的创新都可能是不现实的。最后,第(EC) 1/2003号条例带来的改革侧重于竞争法实施的其他方面,第17号条例第15(2)条的方案已被接管为第(EC) 1/2013号条例第23(2)条,没有重大变化。没有考虑到可能对涉嫌违反竞争法的自然人施加惩罚。欧盟反垄断制裁,欧盟委员会,个别制裁,第1/ 2003号条例,第17号条例,第11号条例,ECSC条约,历史
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Why Does Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 Provide for the Imposition of Penalties Only on Undertakings?: A Historical Perspective
According to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, the Commission may impose any fines for the breach of substantive competition rules only on ‘undertakings’. The provision does not contemplate the imposition of fines on individuals considered responsible for the conduct of the undertaking concerned, even though, as explained in this article, this position is not imposed by the relevant legal basis (Article 83 EC [the Treaty establishing the European Community in the version following the Treaty of Amsterdam], corresponding to Article 87 EEC Treaty [the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community in its version of 1957] and the present Article 103 TFEU [the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union]) That legal basis would indeed allow such liability to be established. From a policy point of view, however, it is often argued that sanctions should also be imposed on such individuals. This raises the question as to why the Union legislator chose not to provide for corresponding powers on the Commission’s part. From the relevant legislative history exposed in this article, it emerges that the approach of Article 23(2)(a) ultimately originates from the ECSC Treaty [theTreaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community]. In this latter context, it reflected the particular limits placed by its authors on that Treaty. It did not reflect the contemporary orientations at national level regarding punitive sanctions. The approach gradually found its way into Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 without any further specific discussion on the way, despite the different context offered by the relevant provisions of the EEC/EC Treaty. It was first transplanted into Regulation No 11, based on Article 79 EEC Treaty (today Article 95 TFEU) and concerning the abolition of discrimination in transport rates and conditions. The negotiations preceding the adoption of this Regulation brought to light strong reserves regarding the conferral of sanctioning powers upon the (then) EEC, and it was no doubt unrealistic to expect that it would have been granted powers more far-reaching than those available under the ECSC Treaty. When Regulation No 17 (and specifically Article 15) was elaborated, the drafters were aware of the scheme established by Regulation No 11, which served as a reference. No genuine discussion regarding possible powers to punish the persons considered responsible for the conduct of the ‘undertaking’ took place. It is likely that any such innovation would not have been realistic at that point. Lastly, the reform brought about by Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 focused on other aspects regarding the implementation of competition law, and the scheme of Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 has been taken over into Article 23(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2013 without major changes. No consideration was given to the possible imposition of penalties on natural persons implicated in the commission of breaches of competition law. EU antitrust sanctions, European Commission, individual sanctions, Regulation No. 1/ 2003, Regulation No 17, Regulation No 11, ECSC Treaty, history
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
0.90
自引率
25.00%
发文量
18
期刊介绍: Information not localized
期刊最新文献
The Decriminalization of Cartel Activity in Kuwait: A Regulatory Framework Collective or Collusive Agreements? World Competition Book Review: Regulation 1/2003 and EU Antitrust Enforcement: A Systematic Guide Kris Dekeyser, Céline Gauer, Johannes Laitenberger, Nils Wahl, Wouter Wils & Luca Prete (Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer 2023) Big Data Requests: The Commission’s Powers to Collect Documents in Investigations Under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1