对美国证券交易委员会提议的机构投资经理报告门槛的评论

Mary E. Barth, Travis Dyer, W. Landsman, Daniel J. Taylor
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们对美国证券交易委员会提议的机构投资经理报告门槛(“提案”)发表评论。我们估计从提案中节省的成本在经济上是很小的,对于平均(中位数)受影响的过滤器来说,相当于管理下资产的0.004%(0.008%),对于最小的过滤器来说,相当于资产的0.02%。这一微小的成本节约需要与投资者和其他人因取消他们大量使用的公开披露而产生的潜在巨大成本进行权衡。我们认为,由于两个原因,该提案第二节中的分析是不完整的。首先,该提案不包含任何正式的经济分析。其次,它没有试图量化表格13F的使用程度或它为投资者和其他利益相关者提供的好处。为了帮助填补这一空白,我们分析了EDGAR系统的使用模式,特别是从EDGAR下载Form 13F的频率。我们的分析表明,投资公众和其他利益相关者对表格13F中的信息非常感兴趣,特别是那些受影响的申报者,并且豁免这些机构提交表格13F将剥夺市场的这些信息。
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Commentary on the SEC's Proposed Reporting Threshold for Institutional Investment Managers
We comment on the Securities and Exchange Commission’s proposed Reporting Threshold for Institutional Investment Managers (“Proposal”). We estimate the cost savings from the Proposal are economically small, and amount to 0.004% (0.008%) of assets under management for the average (median) affected filer, and 0.02% of assets for the smallest filer. This small cost savings needs to be weighed against the potentially large costs to investors and others created by eliminating a public disclosure that they heavily use. We believe the analysis in Section II of the Proposal is incomplete for two reasons. First, the Proposal does not contain any formal economic analysis. Second, it does not attempt to quantify either the extent of use of Form 13F or the benefits that it provides to investors and other stakeholders. To help fill this void, we analyze the usage patterns of the EDGAR system, and specifically the frequency of Form 13F downloads from EDGAR. Our analysis suggests the investing public and other stakeholders are strongly interested in the information in Form 13F filings, particularly those of affected filers, and that exempting such institutions from filing Form 13F would deprive the market of this information.
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