无线问题:Android生态系统中FOTA应用分析

E. Blázquez, S. Pastrana, Álvaro Feal, Julien Gamba, Platon Kotzias, N. Vallina-Rodriguez, J. Tapiador
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引用次数: 10

摘要

Android固件更新通常由所谓的FOTA(固件over - air)应用程序管理。这些应用程序具有很高的特权,在维护设备安全和更新方面发挥着关键作用。Android操作系统为原始设备制造商(oem)提供了标准机制来实现他们自己的FOTA应用程序,但由于糟糕的软件工程实践,这种特定于供应商的实现可能成为安全和隐私问题的来源。本文首次对FOTA生态系统进行了大规模的系统分析,通过使用专门设计的工具检测到的2,013个FOTA应用程序的数据集,超过422,121个预装应用程序。我们对在Android更新生态系统中开发和部署FOTA应用的不同利益相关者进行了分类,结果显示43%的FOTA应用是由第三方开发的。我们报告说,一些设备可以有多达5个应用程序实现FOTA功能。通过对FOTA应用程序代码的静态分析,我们发现一些应用程序存在可被视为侵犯隐私的行为,例如收集敏感用户数据(例如,与唯一硬件标识符链接的地理位置),以及第三方跟踪器的显著存在。我们还发现了导致关键漏洞的实现问题,例如使用公共AOSP测试密钥签名FOTA应用程序和更新验证,从而允许安装使用相同密钥签名的任何更新。最后,我们研究了通过商业安全工具从真实设备收集的遥测数据。我们证明FOTA应用程序负责安装非系统应用程序(例如,娱乐应用程序和游戏),包括恶意软件和潜在有害程序(PUP)。我们的发现表明FOTA开发实践与谷歌的建议不一致。
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Trouble Over-The-Air: An Analysis of FOTA Apps in the Android Ecosystem
Android firmware updates are typically managed by the so-called FOTA (Firmware Over-the-Air) apps. Such apps are highly privileged and play a critical role in maintaining devices secured and updated. The Android operating system offers standard mechanisms—available to Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs)—to implement their own FOTA apps but such vendor-specific implementations could be a source of security and privacy issues due to poor software engineering practices. This paper performs the first large-scale and systematic analysis of the FOTA ecosystem through a dataset of 2,013 FOTA apps detected with a tool designed for this purpose over 422,121 pre-installed apps. We classify the different stakeholders developing and deploying FOTA apps on the Android update ecosystem, showing that 43% of FOTA apps are developed by third parties. We report that some devices can have as many as 5 apps implementing FOTA capabilities. By means of static analysis of the code of FOTA apps, we show that some apps present behaviors that can be considered privacy intrusive, such as the collection of sensitive user data (e.g., geolocation linked to unique hardware identifiers), and a significant presence of third-party trackers. We also discover implementation issues leading to critical vulnerabilities, such as the use of public AOSP test keys both for signing FOTA apps and for update verification, thus allowing any update signed with the same key to be installed. Finally, we study telemetry data collected from real devices by a commercial security tool. We demonstrate that FOTA apps are responsible for the installation of non-system apps (e.g., entertainment apps and games), including malware and Potentially Unwanted Programs (PUP). Our findings suggest that FOTA development practices are misaligned with Google’s recommendations.
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