{"title":"上市公司是否由创始人控制?","authors":"Brian J. Broughman, J. Fried","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3171237","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Black & Gilson (1998) argued that an IPO-welcoming stock market stimulates venture deals by enabling VCs to give founders a valuable “call option on control”. We study 18,000 startups to investigate the value of this option. Among firms that IPO, 60% of founders are no longer CEO. With little voting power, only half of the others survive three years as CEO. At initial VC financing, the probability of getting real control of a public firm for three years is 0.4%. Our results shed light on control evolution in startups, and cast doubt on the plausibility of the call-option theory linking stock and VC markets.","PeriodicalId":57292,"journal":{"name":"公司治理评论","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"8","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Do Founders Control Start-Up Firms that Go Public?\",\"authors\":\"Brian J. Broughman, J. Fried\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3171237\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Black & Gilson (1998) argued that an IPO-welcoming stock market stimulates venture deals by enabling VCs to give founders a valuable “call option on control”. We study 18,000 startups to investigate the value of this option. Among firms that IPO, 60% of founders are no longer CEO. With little voting power, only half of the others survive three years as CEO. At initial VC financing, the probability of getting real control of a public firm for three years is 0.4%. Our results shed light on control evolution in startups, and cast doubt on the plausibility of the call-option theory linking stock and VC markets.\",\"PeriodicalId\":57292,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"公司治理评论\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-09-04\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"8\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"公司治理评论\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3171237\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"公司治理评论","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3171237","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
摘要
Black & Gilson(1998)认为，欢迎ipo的股市使风投能够给予创始人有价值的“控制权看涨期权”，从而刺激了风险投资交易。我们研究了18000家初创公司来调查这种选择的价值。在上市公司中，60%的创始人不再担任CEO。由于没有多少投票权，其他CEO中只有一半能在任三年。在最初的风投融资中，获得上市公司三年实际控制权的概率为0.4%。我们的研究结果揭示了创业公司的控制权演变，并对将股票和风险投资市场联系起来的看涨期权理论的合理性提出了质疑。
Do Founders Control Start-Up Firms that Go Public?
Black & Gilson (1998) argued that an IPO-welcoming stock market stimulates venture deals by enabling VCs to give founders a valuable “call option on control”. We study 18,000 startups to investigate the value of this option. Among firms that IPO, 60% of founders are no longer CEO. With little voting power, only half of the others survive three years as CEO. At initial VC financing, the probability of getting real control of a public firm for three years is 0.4%. Our results shed light on control evolution in startups, and cast doubt on the plausibility of the call-option theory linking stock and VC markets.
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