Carlos Fernández Méndez, Rubén Arrondo García, Shams Pathan
{"title":"CEO薪酬与家族企业异质性:行为代理模型视角","authors":"Carlos Fernández Méndez, Rubén Arrondo García, Shams Pathan","doi":"10.1177/23409444211051754","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We study the effects of family control on CEO pay from the perspective of behavioral agency model (BAM), with particular focus on family firm’s generational stage and CEO family ties. Using a panel of Australian listed firms, we find that family firms present lower total and variable CEO pay, showing also less pay disparity between the CEO and other top executives. We also find that multi-generational family firms and those run by non-family CEOs offer higher total and variable CEO pay and present high pay disparity. The BAM and family’s aversion to socioemotional wealth loss can explain the effects of family control based on the pursuing of non-financial family goals. The decline of these goals derived from the aging of the firm and the hiring of external CEOs shape family control and should be considered in the design of executive compensation policies and by external parties when assessing their suitability. JEL CLASSIFICATION: G30; G32; G34; G38","PeriodicalId":46891,"journal":{"name":"Brq-Business Research Quarterly","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.8000,"publicationDate":"2021-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"CEO pay and family firm heterogeneity: A behavioral agency model perspective\",\"authors\":\"Carlos Fernández Méndez, Rubén Arrondo García, Shams Pathan\",\"doi\":\"10.1177/23409444211051754\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We study the effects of family control on CEO pay from the perspective of behavioral agency model (BAM), with particular focus on family firm’s generational stage and CEO family ties. Using a panel of Australian listed firms, we find that family firms present lower total and variable CEO pay, showing also less pay disparity between the CEO and other top executives. We also find that multi-generational family firms and those run by non-family CEOs offer higher total and variable CEO pay and present high pay disparity. The BAM and family’s aversion to socioemotional wealth loss can explain the effects of family control based on the pursuing of non-financial family goals. The decline of these goals derived from the aging of the firm and the hiring of external CEOs shape family control and should be considered in the design of executive compensation policies and by external parties when assessing their suitability. JEL CLASSIFICATION: G30; G32; G34; G38\",\"PeriodicalId\":46891,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Brq-Business Research Quarterly\",\"volume\":\"2 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":3.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-10-28\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Brq-Business Research Quarterly\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1177/23409444211051754\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Brq-Business Research Quarterly","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/23409444211051754","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
CEO pay and family firm heterogeneity: A behavioral agency model perspective
We study the effects of family control on CEO pay from the perspective of behavioral agency model (BAM), with particular focus on family firm’s generational stage and CEO family ties. Using a panel of Australian listed firms, we find that family firms present lower total and variable CEO pay, showing also less pay disparity between the CEO and other top executives. We also find that multi-generational family firms and those run by non-family CEOs offer higher total and variable CEO pay and present high pay disparity. The BAM and family’s aversion to socioemotional wealth loss can explain the effects of family control based on the pursuing of non-financial family goals. The decline of these goals derived from the aging of the firm and the hiring of external CEOs shape family control and should be considered in the design of executive compensation policies and by external parties when assessing their suitability. JEL CLASSIFICATION: G30; G32; G34; G38
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