企业失败应该归咎于首席执行官吗?第11章文件中的证据

IF 1.9 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Review of Corporate Finance Studies Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI:10.1561/114.00000011
Rajib Chowdhury, John A. Doukas
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引用次数: 6

摘要

这项研究探讨了首席执行官(ceo)是否应该为公司的失败负责。使用替代的CEO管理能力测量,我们证明了高能力(低能力)的CEO与破产相关的可能性更小(更大)。我们还发现,由高能力的现任首席执行官管理的重组公司在申请破产保护后的财务业绩有所改善。聘请有破产经验的高能力ceo的公司也能实现财务业绩的改善。我们的证据表明,公司破产的可能性与高能力管理人员的存在无关,并且破产不会对高能力ceo破产后的职业生涯产生不利影响。
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Are CEOs to Blame for Corporate Failure? Evidence from Chapter 11 Filings
This study examines whether chief executive officers (CEOs) are to blame for corporate failures. Using alternative CEO managerial ability measures, we document that high-ability (low-ability) CEOs are less (more) likely to be associated with bankruptcy. We also find that reorganized firms run by high-ability incumbent CEOs experience improved financial performance after filing for Chapter 11. Firms that hire high-ability CEOs with bankruptcy experience also realize improved financial performance. Our evidence indicates that the likelihood of corporate bankruptcy is unrelated to the presence of high-ability managers and that bankruptcy does not adversely affect the post-bankruptcy careers of high-ability CEOs.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
17.80
自引率
1.80%
发文量
35
期刊介绍: The Review of Corporate Finance Studies (RCFS) is dedicated to publishing high-quality research in the expansive field of Corporate Finance. The journal seeks original contributions, reviewing papers based on their unique insights into Corporate Finance. This encompasses a wide spectrum, including a firm's interactions with stakeholders, capital markets, internal organization structure, compensation mechanisms, corporate governance, and capital management. RCFS also welcomes research in financial intermediation, financial institutions, microstructure, and the implications of asset pricing for Corporate Finance. The journal considers theoretical, empirical, and experimental papers for review.
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