Introduction: Sovereignty and the return of governance for digital platforms

In an era that has been termed one of post-globalization (Flew, 2021), there is considerable debate around governance of the global Internet. In particular, multistakeholder approaches which seek to bypass nation-state governments in the name of global ‘netizens’ have been critiqued as lacking real regulatory capacity to transform the behaviour of digital platforms towards public interest goals. At the same time, there has been a ‘regulatory turn’ (Schlesinger, 2020) in internet governance, with national governments – as well as the European Union – proposing an array of laws, policies, regulations and co-regulatory codes to address issues that include monopoly power, content regulation, data and privacy, and the uses of AI. It has been estimated that over 100 new forms of legislation, regulation and policy reports had been developed across multiple jurisdictions by May 2021, all of which pointed in the direction of growing state direction of the internet and its leading players (Puppis & Winseck, 2021). The result is that Internet governance seems to be perpetually stuck between two registers. The global multistakeholder-based agencies such as ICANN, Internet Governance Forum etc. continue to meet, and to propose measures that assume a relatively stateless form of communications infrastructure. At the same time, with the growing ‘platformisation’ of the Internet (Flew, 2021), nation-states and supranational entities such as the European Union identify a relatively small number of global tech giants who dominate core activities in the digital economy (search, social media, digital advertising, e-commerce etc.), and who derive monopoly profits as well as social influence, political power and communications dominance, and who seek to rein in such power through new forms of regulation. For such activists and regulators, the Internet presents itself less as the borderless future, and more as a set of hegemonic structures akin to the industrial-era giants who prompted the first wave of antitrust laws in the 1920s and 1930s (Deibert, 2020; Wu, 2018). The result is a growing irrelevance of global Internet governance regimes, as national governments proceed apace with setting their own rules around digital industries and online conduct. While a large number of nation-states around the world maintained some controls over the Internet – of which China is by far the largest – the regulatory turn of the 2020s has been a characteristic of the liberal democracies, not least the United States. It comes at a time when US