首次公开发行股票的分配与翻转活动

IF 2.8 Q2 BUSINESS Corporate Communications Pub Date : 2001-06-01 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.274851
Reena Aggarwal
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引用次数: 248

摘要

有一种普遍的误解,认为首次公开募股(ipo)在售后市场的大交易量主要是由于“炒手”,即在发行中分配股票,并在股票开始交易时立即在售后市场转售股票。我们发现,平均而言,在交易的前两天,炒股只占交易量的19%(中位数为17%)和发行股票的15%(中位数为7%);机构比零售客户炒股更多;热门ipo比冷热ipo被炒得更多。有人认为,机构是不倒卖股票的强者,因此在发行中分配了很大比例。然而,我们发现,机构在其配置中的转手比例一直高于零售客户,而机构是聪明的投资者,在承销商仍在提供价格支持的情况下迅速转手冷ipo的假设是不成立的。投资银行密切关注炒股活动,因为过度炒股会给股价带来下行压力,尤其是那些发行不力的股票。他们设计了一些机制,比如惩罚性出价,来限制炒房活动。在我们的样本中,只有在少数ipo中直接评估了明确的罚款投标,而且罚款总额很小。
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Allocation of Initial Public Offerings and Flipping Activity
There is general misperception that the large trading volume in initial public offerings (IPOs) in the aftermarket is mostly due to "flippers" that are allocated shares in the offering and immediately resell them in the aftermarket when the stock starts trading. We find that on average flipping accounts for only 19 percent of trading volume (median of 17 percent) and 15 percent of shares offered (median of 7 percent) during the first two days of trading; institutions do more flipping than retail customers; and hot IPOs are flipped much more than cold IPOs. It has been argued that institutions are strong hands that do not flip shares and are therefore allocated large proportions of an offering. However, we find that institutions consistently flip a larger proportion of their allocation than retail customers and that the hypothesis that institutions are smart investors that quickly flip cold IPOs while the underwriter is still providing price support is not true. Investment banks closely monitor flipping activity because excessive flipping can put downward pressure on the stock price, particularly of weak offerings. They have devised mechanisms, such as penalty bids, to restrict flipping activity. In our sample, explicit penalty bids are directly assessed only in a few IPOs and the total dollar penalties are small.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.90
自引率
20.00%
发文量
38
期刊介绍: Corporate Communications: An International Journal addresses the issues arising from the increased awareness that an organisation''s communications are part of the whole organisation, and that the relationship an organisation has with its external public requires careful management. The responsibility for communications is increasingly being seen as part of every employee''s role and not simply the function of the marketing/PR departments. This journal will illustrate why communications are important and how best to implement a strategic communications plan.
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