共同利益原则与重大交易谈判中的披露

IF 1.9 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW University of Chicago Law Review Pub Date : 2007-10-01 DOI:10.2307/20141866
Anne King
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在公司交易的谈判过程中,每一方都与另一方共享非公开信息。在谈判过程中共享的信息有助于评估开展业务的财务和法律风险。有时,其中一方披露受律师-客户特权保护的通信,如专利意见书或评估公司客户诉讼风险的备忘录。在商业谈判期间披露特权文件似乎意味着对律师-客户特权的默示放弃,这意味着在未来的诉讼中可能会强制要求共享文件。文件共享并不一定会产生豁免:证据法承认,具有共同利益的各方可以共享特权通信,但不放弃特权。然而,可以说,“共同利益原则”并不保护商业谈判期间的信息披露。为了符合共同利益原则,当事人必须拥有“合法的,而不仅仅是商业的”共同利益2,并且当事人必须在未决或未来的诉讼中预见到合作根据这一定义,有人可能会争辩说,参与谈判的公司没有共同利益,因为每一方都寻求将其商业利益最大化
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The Common Interest Doctrine and Disclosures during Negotiations for Substantial Transactions
During negotiations for corporate transactions, each party involved shares non-public information with the other party. Information shared during negotiations is instrumental in assessing the financial and legal risks of doing business. Sometimes, one of the parties discloses communications protected by the attorney-client privilegesuch as a patent opinion letter or a memorandum assessing a corporate client's litigation risks. Disclosure of a privileged document during business negotiations appears to work an implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege, meaning that the shared documents could be compelled in future litigation. Document sharing does not inexorably work a waiver: the law of evidence recognizes that parties with a common interest may share privileged communications without waiving the privilege.' Nevertheless, the "common interest doctrine" arguably does not protect disclosures during business negotiations. In order to come within the common interest doctrine, parties must share a common interest that is "legal, not solely commercial,"2 and parties must anticipate collaboration in pending or future litigation.3 Under this definition, one might argue, corporations engaged in negotiations do not share a common interest because each party seeks to maximize its commercial gain
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.40
自引率
5.00%
发文量
2
期刊介绍: The University of Chicago Law Review is a quarterly journal of legal scholarship. Often cited in Supreme Court and other court opinions, as well as in other scholarly works, it is among the most influential journals in the field. Students have full responsibility for editing and publishing the Law Review; they also contribute original scholarship of their own. The Law Review"s editorial board selects all pieces for publication and, with the assistance of staff members, performs substantive and technical edits on each of these pieces prior to publication.
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