{"title":"论虚拟与非虚拟对象属性的现象功能主义","authors":"A. Ney","doi":"10.2478/disp-2019-0005","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract According to phenomenal functionalism, whether some object or event has a given property is determined by the kinds of sensory experiences such objects or events typically cause in normal perceivers in normal viewing conditions. This paper challenges this position and, more specifically, David Chalmers’s use of it in arguing for what he calls virtual realism.","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"22 1","pages":"399 - 410"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"On Phenomenal Functionalism about the Properties of Virtual and Non-virtual Objects\",\"authors\":\"A. Ney\",\"doi\":\"10.2478/disp-2019-0005\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract According to phenomenal functionalism, whether some object or event has a given property is determined by the kinds of sensory experiences such objects or events typically cause in normal perceivers in normal viewing conditions. This paper challenges this position and, more specifically, David Chalmers’s use of it in arguing for what he calls virtual realism.\",\"PeriodicalId\":52369,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Disputatio (Spain)\",\"volume\":\"22 1\",\"pages\":\"399 - 410\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Disputatio (Spain)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2019-0005\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"Arts and Humanities\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Disputatio (Spain)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2019-0005","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
On Phenomenal Functionalism about the Properties of Virtual and Non-virtual Objects
Abstract According to phenomenal functionalism, whether some object or event has a given property is determined by the kinds of sensory experiences such objects or events typically cause in normal perceivers in normal viewing conditions. This paper challenges this position and, more specifically, David Chalmers’s use of it in arguing for what he calls virtual realism.