美国制药业的盈余分配:来自第四段专利诉讼判决的证据

Ruben Jacobo-Rubio, John L. Turner, Jonathan W. Williams
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引用次数: 5

摘要

在第四段药品案件中,专利诉讼的裁决通常决定了品牌公司的垄断是继续还是出现仿制药进入。利用独特的专利诉讼数据和事件研究方法(考虑了地区法院的概率判决和上诉程序),我们估计在此类案件中,品牌公司的股权平均为43亿美元,而普通公司的股权平均为2.043亿美元。在2002年先灵葆雅诉联邦贸易委员会一案中,品牌公司支付仿制药公司以换取延迟上市的和解后,我们发现和解的可能性更大,而且赌注明显更低,尽管案件中药物的平均品牌销售额更高。在此基础上,我们得出结论,延迟付款解决方案导致了2002年后市场内竞争的减少。
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The Distribution of Surplus in the US Pharmaceutical Industry: Evidence from Paragraph iv Patent-Litigation Decisions
In paragraph iv pharmaceutical cases, a patent-litigation decision often determines whether a brand-firm monopoly continues or generic entry occurs. Using unique patent-litigation data and an event-study approach that accounts for probabilistic district court decisions and an appellate process, we estimate that brand-firm stakes in such cases average $4.3 billion while generic-firm stakes average $204.3 million. After the Schering-Plough v. FTC decision in 2002 that upheld a settlement in which the brand firm paid the generic firm in return for delayed entry, we find that settlement is more likely and stakes are significantly lower, despite greater average brand sales for the drugs in the cases. On the basis of this evidence, we conclude that pay-for-delay settlements led to less within-market competition after 2002.
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